Soliman
v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. Aug.

United States v.
Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 2000), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1202, 121 S.Ct. 1214 (2001) (federal conviction for
conspiracy to perpetrate a checking and savings account kite
scheme, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b), was an "aggravated
felony," under an attempted theft theory of INA § 101(a)(43)(G),
(U), 8 U.S.C.

Iysheh v.
Gonzales, 437 F.3d 613 (7th Cir. Feb. 1, 2006) (federal conviction
of "conspiracy to transport, receive, possess, etc. stolen
motor vehicles" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and
2313(a), constituted a fraud aggravated felony, under INA
§ 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C.

United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979
(5th Cir. Oct. 30, 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1202 (2001)
(federal conviction of conspiracy to perpetrate a checking
and savings account kite scheme, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(b), was an aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(G),
(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), (U), so as to permit enhancement
of the illegal re-entry sentence in defendants base offense
level pursuant to U.S.S.G.

Tran v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 464 (3d Cir.
July 12, 2005) (Pennsylvania conviction of "reckless
burning or exploding," in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
3301(d)(2), did not constitute a crime of violence under 18
U.S.C. § 16(b), and was therefore not an aggravated felony
crime of violence under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

United States v. Landeros-Gonzales,
262 F.3d 424 (5th Cir. Aug. 14, 2001) (Texas conviction for
violation of "criminal mischief" statute, for the
intentional marking of anothers property, in violation of
Texas Penal Code § 28.03(a)(1-3), was not a "crime of
violence" and, consequently, was not an "aggravated
felony" warranting an enhanced sentence under U.S.S.G.

Matter of Palacios-Pinera, 22 I. &
N. Dec. 434 (BIA Dec. 18, 1998) (en banc) (Alaska conviction
of arson in the first degree under section 11.46.400 of the
Alaska Statutes, with a seven-year sentence, was a "crime
of violence" and therefore an aggravated felony under
INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)).

Ramtulla v. Ashcroft,
301 F.3d 202 (4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2002) (Virginia conviction
of concealment of merchandise, in violation of Va.Code Ann.
§ 18.2-103, constitutes a "theft offense" and with
a two-year suspended sentence therefore constitutes an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G)
for deportation purposes).

Omari v. Gonzales, 419
F.3d 303 (5th Cir. July 25, 2005) (federal conviction of interstate
transportation of stolen, converted, and fraudulently obtained
property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, is not an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i) for immigration purposes,
as not all parts of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 necessarily involve fraud
or deceit).

United States v. Vasquez-Flores,
265 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. Sept. 13, 2001), cert. denied, 122
S.Ct. 1180 (2002) (Utah conviction for attempting to knowingly
receive or transfer a stolen motor vehicle, in violation of
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-1a-1316, was an "aggravated felony"
under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) for enhancement
purposes under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2) of an illegal re-entry
sentence).