Kovacs v. U.S., 744 F.3d 44, 49 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2014)(Defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a right that extends to the plea-bargaining process. Lafler v. Cooper, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1384, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012). Thus, ineffective assistance of counsel is one ground for granting a writ of coram nobis. See Chhabra v. United States, 720 F.3d 395, 406 (2d Cir.2013).).

Kovacs v. U.S., 744 F.3d 44, 50-51 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2014) (United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 188 (2d Cir.2002), holding that an affirmative misrepresentation of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea falls outside this range of professional competence, applies retroactively to this case even though Couto was decided the year after Kovacs' 2001 conviction became final: We have little trouble concluding that, by the time Kovacs' conviction became final, the Couto rule was indicated, and was awaiting an instance in which it would be pronounced.

Kovacs v. U.S., 744 F.3d 44, 51 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2014) (The Government observes that these statements [recognizing affirmative misadvice regarding plea as ineffective assistance of counsel] were dicta, not holdings; but if there had been holdings, there would be no occasion now to consider retroactivity. Couto did nothing more than apply the age-old principle that a lawyer may not affirmatively mislead a client. Chaidez, 133 S.Ct. at 1119 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

Kovacs v. U.S., 744 F.3d 44, 51 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2014) (To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.); citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (May 14, 1984).

Kovacs v. U.S., 744 F.3d 44, 51-52 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2014) (Prejudice can arise under Frye if a petitioner can demonstrate a reasonable probability [he] would have accepted the earlier plea offer had [he] been afforded effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 1409. In addition, a petitioner must show a reasonable probability that the end result of the criminal process would have been more favorable by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence of less prison time. Id.); citing Missouri v. Frye, ___ U.S. ___ 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1409, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012).

Matter of Sierra, 26 I & N Dec. 288, 292 (BIA 2014) (Nevada conviction of attempted possession of a stolen vehicle, in violation of Nevada Revised Statute 193.330 and 205.273, was not categorically an aggravated felony as an attempted theft offense, because Nevada law does not require actual knowledge that the property had been stolen, but only reason to believe; aggravated felony theft ground requires intent to deprive, which can be inferred from actual knowledge, but not from reason to believe); citing Matter of Garcia-Madruga, 24 I & N Dec.

Castillo v. Holder, 729 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2013) (state judicial disposition must be a conviction under INA 101(a)(48), , 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48), in order to trigger the criminal conviction bar to non-LPR cancellation of removal).

Miresles-Zuniga v. Holder, 743 F.3d 110 (5th Cir. Feb. 14, 2014) (stop time rules requirement that offense must be referred to in INA 212(a)(2), does not mean that the stop-time rule is met only if a comparable ground of deportation is triggered; respondent was barred from cancellation of removal where conviction was a CMT, triggering inadmissibility, and a domestic violence offense triggering deportability, even though the offense did not trigger deportability as a CMT).

Sarmientos v. Holder, 742 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. Feb. 12, 2014) (Florida conviction of delivery of cocaine, in violation of Florida Statute 893.13(1)(a)(1)(sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance), is not a categorical aggravated felony drug trafficking offense, since Florida statute does not require knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance, while federal offense requires knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance); see State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412, 415"16 (Fla.

Sarmientos v. Holder, 742 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. Feb. 12, 2014) (We may not affirm the BIA's decision except on the basis of the reasons it provided.); quoting Rodriguez"Barajas v. Holder, 624 F.3d 678, 679 (5th Cir. 2010).