Kim v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. Nov. 16, 2006) (noncitizen deportable as aggravated felony cannot waive aggravated felony by application for relief under INA 212(c) because there is no aggravated felony or crime of violence ground of exclusion, even assuming the aggravated felony was also a CMT), following In re Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec. 766, 772-73 (BIA 2005), and Komarenko v. INS, 35 F.3d 432, 435 (9th Cir.1994).

Kim v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. Nov. 16, 2006) (time limit for appealing issues decided by the BIA to federal circuit court is jurisdictional, and therefore cannot be raise upon appeal on collateral issue), following Ven v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 357, 359 (1st Cir.2004).

Jahed v. Acri, 468 F.3d 230 (4th Cir. Nov. 13, 2006) (affirming removal order against claim of derivative citizenship after parents' divorce and father's naturalization, for failure to demonstrate that parents were legally separated for purposes of U.S. immigration law).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/4th/056489p.pdf

Berri v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. Nov. 16, 2006) (petition for review denied where IJ's denial of a continuance was not an abuse of discretion).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/6th/054045p.pdf

United States v. Morales-Perez, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Nov. 13, 2006) (California conviction of purchasing cocaine base with intent to sell, in violation of Health & Safety Code 11351.5(a), categorically constituted a drug trafficking offense under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since the full range of conduct proscribed by the California statute fell within the definition of the federal offense of attempted possession with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C.

United States v. Reina-Rodriguez, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2006) (Utah conviction of second-degree attempted aggravated burglary, under Utah Code Ann. 76-6-203, does not necessarily constitute a "crime of violence" illegal reentry sentencing purposes since Utah conviction of attempted aggravated burglary does not require an entry into a dwelling). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0510475p.pdf

United States v. Reina-Rodriguez, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2006) (Utah conviction of second-degree attempted aggravated burglary, under Utah Code Ann. 76-6-203, does not necessarily constitute a "crime of violence" illegal reentry sentencing purposes, because Utah conviction of attempted aggravated burglary may be committed by merely possessing a dangerous weapon while committing or attempting to commit a burglary, and such possession does not involve the use or threat of force), following United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046, 1047 (9th Cir.

United States v. Reina-Rodriguez, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2006) (Utah conviction of second-degree attempted aggravated burglary, under Utah Code Ann. 76-6-203, a crime of violence for illegal reentry sentencing purposes where the charging document and judgment of conviction, show the conviction was for burglary of a dwelling). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0510475p.pdf

United States v. Reina-Rodriguez, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2006) (reviewing court is bound by state court interpretation of statute defining state criminal offense in performing categorical analysis of whether state conviction falls within federal "crime of violence" definition under USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)), citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 287 U.S. 509, 513, 53 S.Ct. 244, 77 L.Ed. 463 (1933); United States v. Bonat, 106 F.3d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir.

United States v. Reina-Rodriguez, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2006) (reviewing court is bound to interpret a judicial decision so as to avoid holding some of its language to be surplusage: "To hold otherwise would render Taylor's 'remaining in' language surplusage. Courts avoid '[i]nterpretive constructions which render some words surplusage.' In re Eastport Associates, 935 F.2d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir.1991) (quoting California Mfrs. Ass'n v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 24 Cal.3d 836, 157 Cal.Rptr.