Ruiz-Vidal v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 2007) (even though dismiss charge indicated that defendant was originally charged with controlled substances offenses involving methamphetamine, where the defendant entered a plea to an offense that was not charged in the charging document,"there is simply no way for us to connect the references to methamphetamine in the charging document" with the uncharged offense to which the defendant ultimately pleaded guilty), citing Martinez-Perez v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2005). See also, United States v.

Child Citizenship Act of 2000 amendment to INA 101(f) (a person who reasonably believed that they were a citizen because both of their parents were citizens, resided in the country prior to the age of 16 and made a false claim of U.S. citizenship should not be found to not have good moral character).

Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, ___ U.S. ___, 2007 WL 98723 (Jan. 17, 2007) (California conviction of unlawful taking of a vehicle, in violation of Vehicle Code 10851(a), constituted theft offense aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), since the crime of "aiding and abetting" a theft offense is included within the substantive offense).

Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, ___ U.S. ___, 2007 WL 98723 (Jan. 17, 2007) ("[T]o find that state law creates a crime outside the generic definition of a listed crime in a federal statute requires a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct falling outside the generic definition. To make that showing, an offender must at least point to his own case or other cases in which the state courts in fact did apply the statute in the special (nongeneric) manner for which he argues. Respondent makes no such showing.").

Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, ___ U.S. ___, 2007 WL 98723 (Jan. 17, 2007) (question whether California conviction of violating Vehicle Code 10851(a) holds liable accessories after the fact, who need not be shown to have committed a theft, is remanded to the Ninth Circuit for consideration in the first instance).

Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, ___ U.S. ___, 2007 WL 98723 (Jan. 17, 2007) (remanding to Ninth Circuit claim that Cal. Vehicle Code 10851(1) applies to joyriding, which falls outside the generic "theft" definition, is not considered because it does not fall within the terms of the question presented, the lower court did not consider them, and this Court declines to reach them in the first instance).

INA 212(a)(9)(C)(i) renders inadmissible both those who left under a deportation order, and those who had more than one year unlawful presence, and thereafter enter or try to enter illegally. INA 212(a)(9)(C)(ii) states that INA 212(a)(9)(C)(i) shall not apply if the AG consents to readmission. Presumably this means via an I-212. Usually, one thinks of an I-212 as permission to reapply after deportation, but the way clause INA 212(a)(9)(C)(ii) is drafted, it also appears to cover unlawful presence. Under 8 C.F.R.

United States v. Handa, 61 F.3d 1453 (9th Cir. 1997) (after vacating one count of conviction, the trial court has jurisdiction to resentence the defendant on all remaining counts of conviction). Accord, United States v. Harrison, 113 F.3d 135 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Davis, 112 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Smith, 103 F.3d 531 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1861 (1997) (resentencing does not violate double jeopardy); United States v. Gordils, 117 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997); Pasquarille v. United States, 130 F.3d 1220 (6th Cir. 1997) No. 96-6315; United States v.

Compare United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 122 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 1997) (dismissed counts are not reinstated since defendant did not breach plea agreement), with United States v. Buner, 134 F.3d 1000 (10th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-5066) (dismissed counts are reinstated); United States v. Barron, 127 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 1997), amended to add dissenting opinion, 136 F.3d 675 (9th Cir. 1998). See also United States v. Hillary, 106 F.3d 1170, 1172 (4th Cir.

Madu v. U.S. Attorney General, 470 F.3d 1362 (11th Cir. Dec. 1, 2006) (habeas claim noncitizen not subject to removal because he left United States before voluntary departure deadline did not constitute a challenge to final removal order within meaning of REAL ID Act, so court of appeal transferred case).