Counsel may argue that inadmissibility under any of the "reason to believe" grounds of inadmissibility do not stop the clock for purposes of cancellation of removal, since the stop-time rule requires the commission of an offense. That the
officer had 'reason to believe -- is not an "offense" and therefore should not stop the period of continuous physical presence for Cancellation of Removal under 240A(a).

Sanusi v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 148760 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 2007) ("The function of the writ of coram nobis is to secure relief from a judgment rendered while there existed some fact which would have prevented its rendition if it had been known to the trial court and which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was not brought forward before rendition of judgment. " Clorid v. State, 182 S.W.3d 477, 479 (Ark.2004) (quoting State v. Larimore, 17 S.W.3d 87, 93 (Ark.2000)).

Sanusi v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 148760 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 2007) (although a petitioners immigration motive for seeking post-conviction relief is not sufficient by itself to hold vacatur ineffective for immigration purposes, there must be some demonstrable legal basis for the vacatur; defendants "state court petition and the uncontested order of the Arkansas court with the docket entry--On 8-11-03, Milton Dejesus, attorney for defendant, filed a petition for writ of coram nobis. City Attorney had no objection.

Johnson v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 601182 (7th Cir. Feb. 28, 2007) (BIA properly barred motion to reopen to apply for 212(c) as untimely, since it was filed after April, 26, 2005; Attorney General did not act ultra vires in passing 8 C.F.R. 1003.44(h), which placed deadline in brining motions to reopen in light of St. Cyr.) http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/7th/062281p.pdf

Malta-Espinoza v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __ , 2007 WL 624532 (9th Cir. Mar.

Malta-Espinoza v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 624532 (9th Cir. Mar. 2, 2007) ("It is common to charge conjunctively when an underlying statute proscribes more than one act disjunctively; such a charge permits conviction upon proof that the defendant committed either of the conjunctively charged acts. See, e.g., United States v. Bonanno, 852 F.2d 434, 441 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Where a statute specifies to or more ways in which an offense may be committed, all may be alleged in the conjunctive in one count and proof of any one of those acts conjunctively charged may establish guilt.").

Reid v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 603090 (2d Cir. Feb. 28, 2007) (BIA was correct in concluding that stop-time rule is triggered upon commission of listed offense, not conviction).

Matter of Barrientos, 24 I. & N. Dec. 100 (BIA Mar. 1, 2007) (INA 244(b)(5)(B) permits a noncitizen to assert his right to Temporary Protected Status in removal proceedings, even if his application has previously been denied by the Administrative Appeals Unit).

Puello v. BCIS, 418 F.Supp.2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2005) (for purposes of applying the permanent bar to good moral character for conviction of an aggravated felony, under INA 101(f), the date of conviction is the date of sentencing or the date the judgment of conviction was filed with Clerk of Court, rather than on date the guilty plea was entered).

Puello v. BCIS, 418 F.Supp.2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2005) (for purposes of applying the permanent bar to good moral character for conviction of an aggravated felony, under INA 101(f), the date of conviction is the date of sentencing or the date the judgment of conviction was filed with Clerk of Court, rather than on date the guilty plea was entered).