The California Supreme Court held that the sentencing court was precluded from sentencing the defendant on the basis of conduct covered in dismissed counts. People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754. Trial courts therefore accept Harvey waivers from defendants, as part of plea bargains, to allow the court to sentence and impose restitution orders on the basis of conduct covered in dismissed counts.

People v. Rivera, ___ Cal.App.4th ___, 2014 WL 2965946 (1st Dist. July 2, 2014) (defendant's motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal from a postjudgment restitution order is treated as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and granted, where the failure of defendant's trial counsel to file a timely notice of appeal amounts to the ineffective assistance of counsel prohibited by the Sixth Amendment and defendant has established a clear lapse of counsel's professional duty).

People v. Baret, __ N.E.3d __, 2014 WL 2921420 (NY 06/30/14) (Padilla does not apply retroactively in state court post-conviction proceedings).

Ramirez v. State, ___ N.M. ___ (Jun. 19, 2014) (State v. Paredez is retroactive to 1990, when New Mexico instituted a rule requiring the court to advise a defendant pleading guilty that there may be immigration consequences); see Form 9-406 NMRA (1990); Rule 5-303(E)(5) NMRA (1990); Rule 6-502(D)(2) NMRA (1990); Rule 7-502(E)(2) NMRA (1990); & Rule 8-502(D)(2) NMRA (1990); State v. Garcia, 1996-NMSC-013, 8, 121 N.M.

Nevadas drug schedules appear significantly broader than the Federal Controlled Substances schedules, since they include dangerous substances, in addition to controlled substances.

Upon comparing the way drugs are scheduled by the Controlled Substance Act with NRS 453.166 to 453.219, one finds that Nevada uses the identical criteria for scheduling drugs as the Controlled Substance Act. In fact, the Revisers Note at the beginning of NRS Ch. 453 lists the Controlled Substance Act as the original source for 453.166 to 453.219.

Matter of Introcaso, 26 I. & N. Dec. 304 (BIA May 20, 2014) (petitioner bears the burden of proving whether an offense is specified offense against a minor; the categorical approach does not apply to this determination, and DHS can look into the underlying facts of a conviction, even where the elements of the criminal statute would not have supported a finding of ineligibility).

Matter of Jackson, 26 I. & N. Dec. 314 (BIA May 20, 2014) (Adam Walsh Act applies to all convictions suffered by any United States citizen at any time, even those occurring before the AWAs enactment).

Donnee v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 1856738 (1st Cir. May 9, 2014) (a grant of Temporary Protected Status by the Department of Homeland Security only served to prevent execution of the removal order; it did not affect the validity of the order).

Efstathiadis v. Holder, 752 F.3d 591 (2d Cir. May 20, 2014) (Connecticut conviction of sexual assault, in violation of Connecticut General Statute 53a73a(a)(2), may or may not be a crime of moral turpitude, depending on (1) whether it is a strict liability offense with respect to the lack of consent element, and (2) if not, what level of mens rea visvis that element is required to support a conviction; We conclude only that in the context of a conviction arising under C.G.S.

United States v. Guerrero-Jasso, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 2180101 (9th Cir. May 27, 2014) (reversing sentence for illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326, where court impermissibly relied on fact of defendant's removal subsequent to aggravated felony conviction, which was neither admitted by the defendant nor found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000))