Godinez-Arroyo v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 848, 2008 WL 3927229 (8th Cir. Aug. 28, 2008) ("Even if Chevron deference is inappropriate, however, the BIA opinion would nevertheless be eligible for a lesser form of deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944). See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 234, 121 S.Ct. 2164 (noting that "Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmore's holding that an agency's interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form, given the specialized experience and broader investigations and information available to the agency ...

United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 2008 WL 3982104 (2d Cir. Aug. 28, 2008) (government deprived defendants of Sixth Amendment right to counsel by placing conditions on advancement of legal fees; only appropriate remedy is to dismiss the indictment).

Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Richards, 541 F.3d 903, 2008 WL 4051083 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2008) (an adverse inference could properly be drawn from defendants exercise of privilege against self-incrimination).

Matter of Saysana, 24 I. & N. Dec. 602 (BIA Aug. 27, 2008) (a noncitizen otherwise subject to mandatory detention under INA 236(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1226(c)(1), but for having been released from custody prior to October, 1998, will be considered to fall within INA 236(c) if s/he is again subject to lawful non-DHS custody for any reason, regardless of whether the purpose for the detention is unrelated to the offense that triggers mandatory detention), overturned by Saysana v. Gillen, 2008 WL 5484553 (D. Mass, Dec. 1, 2008), following Thomas v. Hogan, 2008 WL 4793739 (M.D.Pa. Oct.31, 2008).

Godinez-Arroyo v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 848, 2008 WL 3927229 (8th Cir. Aug. 28, 2008) (Missouri conviction for second degree assault, recklessly causing serious physical injury, in violation of V.A.M.S. 565.060(3), is a crime of moral turpitude; Missouri law defines recklessness as a "conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk").

Kucana v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 534 (7th Cir. Jul. 7, 2008) (court of appeal lacked jurisdiction to review motions to reopen, except for "questions of law" or constitutional questions), distinguishing Singh v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1024, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2005) (to apply INA 8 U.S.C. 242(a)(2)(B)(ii), 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) to bar jurisdiction over orders denying motions to reopen would make the consolidation rule nonsensical), following Ali v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 2007).

Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. Jul. 2, 2008) (IJ violated statute by failing to afford respondent a chance to review an Immigration Report admitted against her in a removal proceeding).

Kawashima v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. Jul. 1, 2008) (per curiam) (federal conviction for subscribing to a false statement on a tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7206(1), with plea agreement stipulating that the "total actual tax loss" for the purpose of determining his offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines was $245,126, did not categorically constitute a fraud aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C.

Kawashima v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. Jul. 1, 2008) (per curiam) (federal conviction for aiding and assisting in the preparation of a false tax return qualify as "aggravated felonies" return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7206(2), did not categorically constitute a fraud aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), since the statute of conviction is entirely missing an element requiring proof of a monetary loss in excess of $10,000; the court may not consult the record of conviction because the statute is not divisible), following Navarro-Lopez v.

United States v. Byun, 530 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. Jul. 1, 2008) (federal conviction for importation of a noncitizen for purposes of prostitution, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1328, where the plea agreement indicates that the victim was a minor, requires the defendant register as a sex offender under 42 U.S.C. 16911).