Sharashidze v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 1177 (7th Cir. Sept. 8, 2008) (pending circuit court appeal does not toll 90-day time limit for filing motion to reopen with Board of Immigration Appeals).

United States v. Ayala, 542 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. Sept. 8, 2008) (Texas conviction for indecency with a child in violation of Texas Penal Code 21.11(a)(1), is sexual abuse of a minor, even though the statute punishes sex with a person that is one day shy of 18 years old), following United States v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601, 604 (5th Cir.2000).

United States v. Ayala, 542 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. Sept. 8, 2008) (Texas conviction for indecency with a child in violation of Texas Penal Code 21.11(a)(1), is sexual abuse of a minor, even though the statute punishes sex with a person that is one day shy of 18 years old), following United States v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601, 604 (5th Cir.2000).

Bakarian v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2008) (noncitizen with 1996 conviction could not show 7 years continuous residence for LPR cancellation where he had been admitted in 1987 as a visitor, and traveled between the U.S. and Russia numerous times before his admission as an LPR in 1990; residence period did not start in 1987, given noncitizens numerous and length trips to Russia before his LPR admission in 1990).

Bakarian v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2008) (noncitizen not excused from preserving retroactivity issue for appeal by raising it before the BIA; it was not futile to bring issue before the BIA where U.S. Supreme Court case provided new means to argue against older BIA precedent decision).

Gertsenshteyn v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. Sept. 25, 2008) ("When the BIA has adopted the IJ's reasoning and offered additional commentary, we review the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. Wala, 511 F.3d at 105. Additionally, when our jurisdiction depends on the definition of a phrase used in the INA, and "when the intent of Congress is unclear and the agency's interpretation is reasonable," we accord the BIA's determination the deference mandated by the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron. Mugalli, 258 F.3d at 55 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Gertsenshteyn v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. Sept. 25, 2008) ("We have adopted a "categorical approach" to deciding whether a crime of conviction fits within the definition of "aggravated felony" in 1101(a)(43), thereby rendering an alien removable under 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Santos v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 323, 325 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam). Under this approach, which is sometimes called the Taylor-Shepard approach, after Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), and Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S.

United States v. Gomez-Leon, 545 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 2008) (California conviction for vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated without gross negligence, in violation of Penal Code 192(c)(3) (1998), was not "crime of violence" for purposes of sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) for illegal reentry following conviction for qualifying felony, because the elements require only proof of ordinary negligence, so cannot fall within the contemporary meaning of manslaughter as enumerated in U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 cmt. 1(B)(iii)).

United States v. Gomez-Leon, 545 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 2008). This case has a detailed discussion of the differences between the different statutes and methods of defining "crime of violence."

United States v. Gomez-Leon, 545 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 2008) (California conviction for sale or offering to sell a controlled substance, under Health & Safety Code 11379(a), constituted "drug trafficking crime" for guidelines purposes: "According to the written plea agreement, Gomez pled guilty to Count Two of the written complaint, which alleged that he "did unlawfully sell, furnish, administer, give away, or offer to sell, furnish, administer, and give away ...