Mowlana v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 5730791 (8th Cir. Sept. 30, 2015) (in determining whether a federal conviction categorically qualifies as a ground of removal, the realistic probability inquiry applies just as when analyzing a state-law offense); following Bobadilla v. Holder, 679 F.3d 1052, 1055"57 (8th Cir.2012); see Rios"Diaz v. Holder, 543 F. App'x 617, 618 (8th Cir.2013); see also Sampathkumar v. Holder, 573 F. App'x 55, 57 (2d Cir.2014); Familia Rosario v. Holder, 655 F.3d 739, 749 (7th Cir. 2011); Accardo v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 634 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir.2011).

Morales v Gonzales, 478 F3d 972 (9th Cir. 2007) (a defendants admission to facts for a limited purpose does not become part of the record of conviction and cannot be used in subsequent proceedings).

Note: Facts recited by a court of appeals opinion affirming the sufficiency of the evidence for conviction were not facts admitted by the defendant for their truth and should not have been considered part of the record of conviction for purposes of determining the nature of the conviction for immigration purposes.

She v. Holder, 629 F.3d 958, 963-64 (9th Cir. 2010) ([W]e lack the clairvoyance necessary to confidently infer the reasoning behind the BIAs conclusion [ ] " reversing BIA for lack of clarity in reason for decision).

People v. Espinoza, 232 Cal App 4th Supp 1 (Fresno Superior Court 2015) (depublication request denied by California Supreme Court on Mar. 25, 2015).

United States v. Whindleton, 797 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. Aug. 10, 2015) (Massachusetts conviction for conviction for assault with a deadly weapon under Massachusetts General Laws ch. 265, 15B(b) [[w]hoever, by means of a dangerous weapon, commits an assault upon another.], constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA); following United States v. Am, 564 F.3d 25, 33 & n. 9 (1st Cir. 2009) (an ADW conviction under under Massachusetts General Laws ch. 265, 15B(b) clearly satisfies the ACCA's Force Clause).

Pina-Galindo v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. Sept. 24, 2015) (per curiam) (non-LPR cancellation criminal bar includes inadmissibility INA 212(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(B) [multiple convictions with sentences totaling five years or more]).

Pena v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 2015) (Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider alien's petition for review of expedited removal order under 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1), 1252(a)(2)(D), (e)).

The Padilla case overrules U.S. v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2000). This First Circuit decision held that immigration consequences were collateral to a criminal conviction and, therefore, a guilty plea could not be withdrawn due to failure to warn the defendant about immigration consequences of his plea. See Padilla, 2010 U.S. LEXIS at*16, n. 9.

Padilla also overrules Commonwealth v. Fraire, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 916 (2002), and Commonwealth v. Monteiro, 56 Mass. App. Ct.

Although Padilla does not require prosecutors to consider immigration consequences, it certainly encourages them to consider such consequences during plea negotiations. The decision states that informed consideration of possible deportation can only benefit both the State and noncitizen defendants during the plea- bargaining process. Padilla, 2010 U.S. LEXIS at *30. The Court recognized that immigration consequences often stem directly from criminal convictions, and are often even more important to a defendant than the criminal sentence he faces. Id. at *21.

Levesque v. Lynch, 802 F.3d 152, 154 (1st Cir. Sept. 18, 2015) (only foreign convictions for which the term of imprisonment was completed after the previous 15 years are excluded from the aggravated felony definition; the exclusion does not apply to federal and state convictions).