People v. Tidwell, ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (6th Dist. Mar. 17, 2016) (a dismissal pursuant to section 1203.4 does not preclude relief under Proposition 47 and concede the trial court erred in denying defendants request to reduce the felonies to misdemeanors).

The court stated:

With certain exceptions, the effect of the dismissal is that the defendant shall . . . be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense of which he or she has been convicted . . . . (Ibid.) Section 1203.4 further provides:

However, in any subsequent prosecution of the defendant for any other offense, the prior conviction may be pleaded and proved and shall have the same effect as if probation had not been granted or the accusation or information dismissed. The order shall state, and the probationer shall be informed, that the order does not relieve him or her of the obligation to disclose the conviction in response to any direct question contained in any
questionnaire or application for public office [or] for licensure by any state or local agency . . . . (Ibid.)

The statutory language plainly limits the effect of the dismissal pursuant to section 1203.4 to the qualifying defendants release from most penalties and disabilities stemming from the conviction. [T]he conviction may be treated as if it were not a conviction for most purposes. (People v. Guillen, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 996.)

But it does not, strictly speaking, expunge the conviction, nor render the conviction a legal nullity. (Ibid., quoting People v. Frawley (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 784, 791.) As courts have noted, [t]he limitations on this relief are numerous and substantial, including other statutes declaring that an order under section 1203.4 is ineffectual to avoid specified consequences of a prior conviction. (People v. Frawley, supra, at p. 791
[citing statutes, e.g., Veh. Code, 13555 (revocation or suspension of privilege to drive a motor vehicle); Bus. & Prof. Code, 490 (suspension or revocation of professional license); id., 6102, subd. (c) (summary disbarment of attorney); id., 2236.1, subd. (d) (suspension of medical license)].) Noteworthy among the limitations to relief under section 1203.4 is the provision that in any subsequent prosecution of the defendant for
any other offense, the prior conviction may be pleaded and proved . . . . ( 1203.4, subd. (a); People v. Frawley, supra, at pp. 791-792 [describing this limitation as sweeping].)

(Id. at ___.)

The court continued:

Nothing in the language of section 1170.18 alters this conclusion in light of defendant having obtained a dismissal of those convictions under section 1203.4. As noted above, the statutory dismissal that defendant obtained did not expunge his record or cancel the potential for continuing or future consequences of those convictions. (People v. Guillen, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 996.) The text of Proposition 47, as enacted by the voters, provides that [t]his act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes. (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, 18, p. 74.) Among its stated purposes is to ensure that prison spending is focused on violent and serious offenses [and] to maximize alternatives for nonserious, nonviolent crime . . . . (Id., 2, p. 70.) To foreclose defendants eligibility based on the section 1203.4 dismissal would contravene this intent, where defendant has met the criteria under section 1170.18 according to the terms of the statute.

Nor does the intent behind a grant of relief under section 1203.4 undermine or conflict with the later application of section 1170.18. The decision in Meyer v. Superior Court (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 133 supports this conclusion by analogy. In that case, the trial court denied the petitioners application under section 17 to declare the offense for which the petitioner was convicted to be a misdemeanor. (Meyer v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 134.) One issue on appeal was whether the petitioner was barred in his application because his record was expunged under section 1203.4. (Meyer v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 139-140.) The appellate court reasoned that expungement of the record under section 1203.4 is . . . a reward for good conduct and has never been treated
as obliterating the fact that the defendant has been convicted of a felony.

(Id. at p. 140.)

Because a conviction which has been expunged still exists for limited purposes, including, among others, evidentiary use at a later trial [citation] and the denial of the right to carry a concealable weapon [citation] . . . petitioner should not be barred from pursuing a more suitable remedy . . . . (Ibid.) That same reasoning applies here. The trial court did not find that defendant was convicted of a category of violent and serious
offenses of the sort that precludes eligibility for Proposition 47 relief, or that his application was otherwise defective. The dismissal of his felonies pursuant to section 1203.4 operated to mitigat[e] some of the consequences of his conviction and, with a few exceptions, to restore him to his former status in society . . . . but did not erase the convictions. (People v. Field (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1778, 1787, quoting Selby
v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 470, 473.) As such, it was error for the trial court to deny defendants applications pursuant to section 1170.18 on the ground that he already had obtained dismissals pursuant to section 1203.4.

(Id. at ___.)