Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32, 71 S. Ct. 703, 708 (1951) (We have several times held that difficulty in determining whether certain marginal offenses are within the meaning of the language under attack as vague does not automatically render a statute unconstitutional for indefiniteness. . . . Whatever else the phrase crime involving moral turpitude may mean in peripheral cases, the decided cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud was an ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude. We have recently stated that doubt as to the adequacy of a standard in less obvious cases does not render that standard unconstitutional for vagueness.); Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1069 (9th Cir. 2007) (Judge Pregerson, concurring) (Take the example of a welfare mother who falsely endorses and then cashes a social security check mistakenly issued to her deceased father. The woman knows that she does not have the right to the money. She forges her father's signature. But, she needs money to feed her hungry children. Although such conduct is illegal, it is not base, vile, or depraved.); overruled by United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2011); Matter of T, 2 I&N Dec 22 ((BIA, A.G. 1944) (Boardmember Jack Wassermans dissent) (It should be noted that if the alien's crime were stretched, without legal warrant, into a petty larceny, the view has been forcefully expressed that not all petty larcenies involve moral turpitude. Lord Bacon said that it is not even larceny to steal viands to satisfy hunger (Bacon, Law Tracts, 2d Ed. (1741) Reg. 5, p. 55). Yet this would generally be considered a crime although the act itself would not indicate moral turpitude. Judge Thomas in U.S. ex rel. Rizzio v. Kenny, 50 F.(2d) 418, 419 (D.C. Conn., 1931) recognized that larceny in some circumstances did not involve moral turpitude. In Tillinghast v. Edmead, 31 F.(2d) 81, 84 (C.C.A.1st, 1929), Judge Anderson said in a dissenting opinion: `It seems to me monstrous to hold that a mother stealing a bottle of milk for her hungry child, or a foolish college student stealing a sign or a turkey, should be tainted as guilty of a crime of moral turpitude.' In the lower court opinion, Judge Morton said (27 F.(2d) 438, at 439): `While there is authority that all larceny involves moral turpitude * * * I am not prepared to agree that a boy who steals an apple from an orchard is guilty of `inherently base, vile, or depraved conduct.' Where the larceny is petty, I think that the circumstances must be inquired into.' In a discussion with reference to petty offenses and moral turpitude, Mr. Prichard, special assistant to the Attorney General, said in a memorandum dated Apr. 5, 1941, in the case of Re G, 56040/601: `* * * in connection with some offenses at least, doubt should be resolved against exclusion of deportation upon this ground. Certainly it would seem harsh and oppressive to hold that a crime for which only a fine or a suspended jail sentence was involved is the proper basis for excluding from the United States one who seeks admission.' id, n.10); Castillo v. Holder, 776 F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2015) (The BIA thus construed the term theft offense to encompass the taking of property when there is criminal intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent. Id. at 1346. Notably, however, in articulating this construction of the statute, the BIA emphasized that [n]ot all takings of property ... will meet this standard[,] because some takings entail a de minimis deprivation of ownership interests and constitute only a glorified borrowing of property. Id.); Tillinghast v. Edmead, 31 F.2d 81, 84 (1st Cir. 1929) (Anderson, Circuit Judge, dissenting) (It seems to me monstrous to hold that a mother stealing a bottle of milk for her hungry child, or a foolish college student stealing a sign or a turkey, should be tainted as guilty of a crime of moral turpitude. But such is the logical result of the majority opinion.); Marciano v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1028 (8th Cir. 1971) (District Judge Garnett, dissenting) (There are the cases cited by Judge Anderson in his dissent in Tillinghast v. Edmead, 31 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1929), of a mother stealing milk for her hungry child, of a foolish college student stealing a sign, and of a boy stealing an apple from an orchard; and there is the situation posed by Judge Learned Hand of a boy's forcing his way into a vacant building, United States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, supra. There are, of course, literally hundreds of other examples that could be given. All of these hypothetical situations are crimes, involving criminal intent and criminal culpability. All of them could result in deportation under the rule of Pino v. Nicolls, and of the majority here, because such crimes as larceny, burglary, and breaking and entering usually, commonly and generally involve moral turpitude. None of them can be said to involve moral turpitude, however; not, at least, without further examination into the factual context. It might be that today some crimes would be held to involve moral turpitude which judges writing in past years did not think contravened the moral standards of that time. The converse might be true with regard to other types of offenses. The point is that I do not believe Congress intended for all aliens in these, and many other hypothetical situations, be deported. The statute says deportation shall follow when the crime committed involves moral turpitude, not when that type of crime commonly or usually does.); Quilodran-Brau v. Holland, 232 F.2d 183, 184 (3d Cir. 1956) (Whether there is a possible exception in an extreme case such as that instanced by troubled judges where a man takes the property of another to provide for his starving family is not a problem we need to worry about here.); see K. Brady, et al., Defending Immigrants in the Ninth Circuit (2008) (Theft. Despite case law to the contrary, immigration counsel at least can argue that conviction for theft under Calif. Penal Code 484 or 487 should be held a divisible statute for moral turpitude purposes, because the offense of larceny, noted in the statute as steal[ing], tak[ing], carry[ing], lead[ing], or driv[ing] away the personal property of another does not require in every case the intent to carry away or to deprive the owner of the property permanently. . . . . In fact, it is possible to be convicted of this section where the intent is to deprive only temporarily. The California Jury Instructions, CALJIC 14.02 states that theft by larceny under PC 487 is committed by every person who steals, takes, carries . . . with the specific intent to deprive the owner permanently of property. However, CALJIC 14.03 says the specific intent is satisfied by either an intent to deprive an owner permanently of his or her property, or to deprive an owner temporarily, but for an unreasonable time, so as to deprive him or her of a major portion of its value or enjoyment. Advocates can therefore argue that theft under these statutes should not categorically be crimes of moral turpitude, similar to a joyriding statute, such as California Vehicle Code 10851(a), which is divisible for moral turpitude purposes because it involves the taking of a vehicle with intent either to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of title or possession. See, e.g., Matter of Kochlani, 24 I&N Dec. 128 (BIA 2007)(Calif. PC 487 involves moral turpitude); United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 193 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 1999); see Matter of T, 2 I&N Dec. 22 (BIA 1944); Matter of M, 2 I&N Dec. 686 (BIA 1946). Thanks to Jonathan Moore.