Reid v. Donelan,___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 1458915 (1st Cir. Apr. 13, 2016) (migrants subjected to unreasonable detention through INA 236(c) are entitled to an individualized bond hearing; Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause does not require DHS to bring all detainees before an immigration judge for a bond hearing once they have been locked up for six months).

Note: Every federal court of appeals to examine the mandatory detention statute, INA 236(c), 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), has recognized that the Due Process Clause imposes some form of reasonableness limitation upon the duration of detention that can be considered justifiable under that statute. See Reid v. Donelan, supra; Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 606 (2d Cir.2015); Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir.2013); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 232"33 (3d Cir.2011); Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 269"70 (6th Cir.2003). Each circuit has found it necessary to read an implicit reasonableness requirement into the statute itself, generally based on the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. See Lara, 804 F.3d at 614; Rodriguez, supra, 715 F.3d at 1138; Diop, 656 F.3d at 235; Ly, 351 F.3d at 270.

The courts of appeal, however, are split as to whether to use a bright-line rule requiring an individualized bond hearing after detention has reached the six-month point. In the First, Third, and Sixth Circuits, every detainee must file a habeas petition challenging detention, and the district courts must then adjudicate the petition to determine whether the individual's detention has crossed the reasonableness' threshold, thus entitling him to a bail hearing. Lora, 804 F.3d at 614; see also Ly, 351 F.3d at 272. See Reid v. Donelan,___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 1458915 (1st Cir. Apr. 13, 2016)(not automatically requiring a hearing after six months detention); Diop, 656 F.3d at 233 (Third Circuit noting that the inquiry into whether detention has become unreasonable will necessarily be a fact-dependent inquiry that will vary depending on individual circumstances and declin[ing] to establish a universal point at which detention will always be considered unreasonable); Ly, 351 F.3d at 271 (Sixth Circuit stating: A bright-line time limitation ... would not be appropriate.... [C]ourts must examine the facts of each case[ ] to determine whether there has been unreasonable delay in concluding removal proceedings.).

The First Circuit in Reid stated:

The Second and Ninth Circuits, on the other hand, have appl[ied] a bright-line rule to cases of mandatory detention and have held that the government's statutory mandatory detention authority under Section 1226(c) ... [is] limited to a six-month period, subject to a finding of flight risk or dangerousness. Lara, 804 F.3d at 614 (alterations in original) (quoting Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at 1133). Under this interpretation, every alien held pursuant to 1226(c) must be provided a bond hearing once his or her detention reaches the six-month mark, because any categorical and mandatory detention beyond that timeframe is presumptively unreasonable. Id. at 616. The detainee may continue to be held if an IJ determines that the individual does, in fact, pose a flight risk or danger to society, but the categorical nature of the detention expires. Id.

The Supreme Court may grant cert to resolve this circuit split.