United States v. Jimenez-Arzate, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 149802 (9th Cir. Jan. 12, 2015) (per curiam) (California conviction for assault with deadly weapon, in violation of Penal Code 245(a)(1), was categorically a crime of violence, for federal sentencing purposes, rejecting the argument that the California courts have weakened the intent requirement to recklessness, which involves insufficient intent to qualify, so United States v. Grajeda, 581 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2009), is no longer good law in light of People v. Aznavoleh, 210 Cal.App.4th 1181, 148 Cal.Rptr.3d 901, 904 (2012), and People v. Wyatt, 48 Cal.4th 776, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 259, 229 P.3d 156, 157 (2010)).

The court reasoned:

We disagree. Aznavoleh involved a defendant who intentionally ran a red light while racing another car down the street even though he saw a car entering the intersection on the green. The defendant made no effort to stop despite a passenger warning him that he needed to stop. The California Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's finding that the defendant met the willfulness element of assault under California Penal Code 245(a)(1), which the California Court of Appeal defined as intentionality.

Wyatt involved a father who, while play wrestling with his infant son, struck the boy with such force that he killed him. [Citation omitted.] The Wyatt court upheld the father's conviction for involuntary manslaughter and assault on a child causing death because substantial evidence established that defendant knew he was striking his young son with his fist, forearm, knee, and elbow, and that he used an amount of force a reasonable person would realize was likely to result in great bodily injury. Id. As did the California Court of Appeal in Aznavoleh, the California Supreme Court in Wyatt explained that a defendant guilty of assault must be aware of the facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that a battery would directly, naturally and probably result from his conduct. He may not be convicted based on facts he did not know but should have known. Id. at 159 (quoting People v. Williams, 26 Cal.4th 779, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197, 203 (2001)).

Contrary to Jimenez"Arzate's argument, Aznavoleh did not hold that an automobile accident stemming from merely reckless driving may result in a conviction under 245(a)(1). The defendant in Aznavoleh engaged in street racing, heedlessly disregarding a perceived likelihood of death or grave injury to others. Likewise, in Wyatt, a reasonable person would have recognized the dangers of striking a child with the deadly force used, even if the defendant was not subjectively aware of the risks of his play wrestling with the child in that manner.

(Id. at ___.)