Christeson v. Roper, ___ U.S. ___, 2015 WL 232187 (Jan. 20, 2015) (per curiam) (a conflict of interest, as here, in which counsel's contentions were directly and concededly contrary to their client's interest and manifestly served their own professional and reputational interests, is grounds for substitution of counsel, since original counsel had missed the filing deadline for a habeas corpus petition, and therefore could not be expected to argue that petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations because counsel's interest in avoiding damage to his own reputation was at odds with his client's strongest argument, that is, that counsel abandoned him; the court of appeals abused its discretion in denying petitioner's second request for substitution of federally-appointed counsel under interests of justice standard); see Martel v. Clair, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1276, 182 L.Ed.2d 135 (2012).

The court stated:

The court's principal error was its failure to acknowledge Horwitz and Butts' conflict of interest. Tolling based on counsel's failure to satisfy AEDPA's statute of limitations is available only for serious instances of attorney misconduct. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 651-652, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010). Advancing such a claim would have required Horwitz and Butts to denigrate their own performance. Counsel cannot reasonably be expected to make such an argument, which threatens their professional reputation and livelihood. See Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers 125 (1998). Thus, as we observed in a similar context in Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. """", """", n. 8, 132 S.Ct. 912, 925, n. 8, 181 L.Ed.2d 807 (2012), a significant conflict of interest arises when an attorney's interest in avoiding damage to [his] own reputation is at odds with his client's strongest argument" i.e., that his attorneys had abandoned him.

Indeed, to their credit, Horwitz and Butts acknowledged the nature of their conflict. Shortly before the first motion for substitution was filed, they provided an update to the Missouri Supreme Court on the status of Christeson's collateral proceedings. In it, they stated:

Because counsel herein would be essential witnesses to factual questions indispensable to a Holland inquiry, there may be ethical and legal conflicts that would arise that would prohibit counsel from litigating issues that would support a Holland claim. Unwaivable ethical and legal conflicts prohibit undersigned counsel from litigating these issues in any way. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485"486 [98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426] (1978). Conflict free counsel must be appointed to present the equitable tolling question in federal district court. App. to Pet. for Cert. 48a"49a.

Yet, in their response to the District Court's order to address the substitution motion, Horwitz and Butts characterized the potential arguments in favor of equitable tolling as ludicrous, and asserted that they had a legal basis and rationale for the [erroneous] calculation of the filing date. Id., at 86a, 90a. While not every case in which a counseled habeas petitioner has missed AEDPA's statute of limitations will necessarily involve a conflict of interest, Horwitz and Butts' contentions here were directly and concededly contrary to their client's interest, and manifestly served their own professional and reputational interests.

Clair makes clear that a conflict of this sort is grounds for substitution. Even the narrower standard we rejected in that case would have allowed for substitution where an attorney has a disabling conflict of interest. 565 U.S., at """", 132 S.Ct., at 1284. And that standard, we concluded, would gu[t] the specific substitution-of-counsel clause contained in 3559(e), which must contemplate the granting of such motions in circumstances beyond those where a petitioner effectively has no counsel at all"as is the case when counsel is conflicted. Id., at """", 132 S.Ct., at 1286. Indeed, we went so far as to say that given a capital defendant's statutory right to counsel, even in the absence of 3599(e) a district court would be compelled to appoint new counsel if the first lawyer developed a conflict. Ibid.

(Id. at ___.)
Cal Crim Def 20.39