Under Descamps and Moncrieffe, arguably no California conviction of burglary, in violation of Penal Code 459, is a crime of moral turpitude, because the specific intended offense is not an "element" of burglary but merely a "means" of committing the offense, since the jury need not agree unanimously as to which specific offense was intended at the time of the entry. Therefore the immigration judge must decide the case on the minimum conduct sufficient to commit burglary, which could include intent to commit a felony which is not a crime of moral turpitude, and the immigration judge may not look to the record of conviction to see which felony was intended, because the statute is not divisible with respect to which felony was intended. For discussion of elements versus means in this context, see Practice Advisory at
www.nipnlg.org/legalresources/practice_advisories/cd_pa_Descamps_Practic....

This argument is supported by specific language in California jury instructions for trials involving Penal Code 459 that state that, at least in deciding between intended offenses charged by the prosecution, the jury does not need unanimously to agree as to the identity of the intended offense in order to return a guilty verdict. CALCRIM 1700 (The People allege that the defendant intended to commit (theft/ [or] ). You may not find the defendant guilty of burglary unless you all agree that (he/she) intended to commit one of those crimes at the time of the entry. You do not all have to agree on which one of those crimes (he/she) intended.]")(emphasis supplied). Thanks to Katherine Brady.