Ineffective assistance of counsel voids a guilty plea (which is supposed to be a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of many rights) if there is prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent counsels error. The most recent all-jurisdiction Supreme Court statement of this principle is found in Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (March 21, 2012). The court there held that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel extends to the consideration of plea offers that lapse or are rejected. That right applies to all critical stages of the criminal proceedings. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 173 L.Ed.2d 955. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203, established that Stricklands two-part test governs ineffective-assistance claims in the plea bargain context. There, the defendant had alleged that his counsel had given him inadequate advice about his plea, but he failed to show that he would have proceeded to trial had he received the proper advice. 474 U.S., at 60, 106 S.Ct. 366. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284, where a plea offer was set aside because counsel had misinformed the defendant of its immigration consequences, this Court made clear that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical stage for ineffective-assistance purposes, id., at 1392, 130 S.Ct., at 1486 and rejected the argument made by the State in this case that a knowing and voluntary plea supersedes defense counsel's errors.