Esparza-Rodriguez v. Holder, 699 F.3d 821, *823, 2012 WL 4937384 (5th Cir. Oct. 18, 2012) (To rise to the level of a CIMT, the BIA has held that an assault statute must have at least two characteristics. First, the scienter element must require specific intent, or, put another way, the actus reus must be accompanied by the evil intent, depraved or vicious motive, or corrupt mind associated with moral turpitude. Id. at 241. Second, the assault statute must require a meaningful level of harm, which must be more than mere offensive touching. Id. at 241"42. Several courts, but not all, and the BIA, but not always, require also an aggravating element indicative of the inherent vileness of the prohibited conduct.).

In footnote 6, the court cited additional authority:

See Nguyen v. Reno, 211 F.3d 692, 695 (1st Cir.2000) (explaining that an assault may or may not be a crime of moral turpitude, noting that the dividing line is the aggravating element); Uppal v. Holder, 605 F.3d 712, 717 (9th Cir.2010) ([T]o rise to the level of moral turpitude, an assault crime must involve a particular type of aggravating factor, one that says something about the turpitude or blameworthiness inherent in the action.). Contra Mustafaj v. Holder, 369 Fed.Appx. 163, 168"69 (2d Cir.2010) (unpublished) (holding that a New York assault statute qualified as a CIMT even though it lacked an aggravating factor). The BIA's decision-making on this point also has been uneven. Compare Matter of Ahortalejo"Guzman, 25 I. & N. Dec. 465, 465 (BIA 2011) (explaining that simple assault is not a CIMT unless it necessarily involves some aggravating factor that indicates the perpetrator's moral depravity), with In re Solon, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 242"46 (explaining that although the presence of an aggravating factor can be important in determining whether a particular assault amounts to a crime involving moral turpitude ... the need for, and the nature of, any aggravating factor is affected by the mental state required for the conviction).

(Id. at ___ n.6.)