Federal Youth Corrections Act expungements, under 18 U.S.C. 5021, may continue to be effective to eliminate the adverse immigration effects of federal criminal convictions. United States v. Gardner, 860 F.2d 1391, 1399, n.2 (7th Cir. 1988) (sentencing provisions of FYCA remain available for crimes committed after its repeal because to do otherwise would violate prohibition against ex post facto laws in U.S. Constitution); United States v. Countryman, 758 F.2d 574, 579 n. 2 (11th Cir.1985) (sentencing provisions of FYCA remain available for crimes committed after its repeal because to do otherwise would violate prohibition against ex post facto laws in U.S. Constitution). See Matter of Zingis, 14 I. & N. Dec. 621 (BIA 1974) (before the repeal of the Federal Youth Corrections Act, the BIA held that an FYCA expungement eliminated the fact of a conviction for immigration purposes). After the repeal of the Federal Youth Corrections Act, but before Congress enacted a definition of conviction in IIRIRA, the BIA continued to hold that an FYCA expungement eliminated the fact of a conviction for immigration purposes. See Castano v. INS, 956 F.2d 236, 237 n.3 (11th Cir. 1992) (recognizing post-repeal BIA policy). After the enactment of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48), the BIA held that the new definition applies to convictions before, on, or after effective date of conviction definition. Matter of Roldan, 22 I. & N. Dec. 512 (BIA 1999). In Roldan, the BIA dealt with a state expungement. There is no current authority regarding the FYCA squarely. Even if the client could get a FYCA expungement now, it has never insulated a noncitizen from "reason to believe" inadmissibility, which does not require a conviction. See, e.g, Castano v. INS, 956 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1992); Matter of Favela, 16 I&N Dec. 753 (BIA 1979). Thanks to Dan Kesselbrenner.