Johnson v. Uribe, 682 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. Jun. 22, 2012) (reversing district courts grant of habeas corpus relief invalidating only the sentence, since ineffective assistance of counsel affected the entire plea negotiation stage of the proceedings in the Superior Court: "Although the district court found that Johnson would still have entered into the Vargas waiver when it was offered, we cannot properly determine whether, with effective assistance of counsel, Johnson would have even reached that point in the proceedings. It is impossible for us to know how the earlier stages of the plea negotiation process might have progressed had Durdines rendered effective counsel from the outset by correctly evaluating the charges against Johnson. Where, as here, it is mere speculation to assume that the plea negotiations would have progressed in a similar fashion with competent counsel, we cannot allow the defendant to be prejudiced by that uncertainty. See United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (The Sixth Amendment mandates that the State [or the government] bear the risk of constitutionally
deficient assistance of counsel.) (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986)).

Note: Counsel can use this authority to counter the prosecutors argument that the defendant has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that an immigration-neutral disposition would have been offered and that therefore it is mere speculation that the defendant would have rejected the plea offer. Moreover, the Strickland prejudice standard does not require proof by a preponderance of the evidence, but only by a lesser standard sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Thanks to Michael K. Mehr.