Crimes of Moral Turpitude

(B)

State Label.  The label given to the offense by the state (i.e., what the offense is called by the state) is also irrelevant.[93]  The label a state gives a particular crime is not an element of a conviction under that statute, and is irrelevant in determining whether a conviction involves moral turpitude.  In Matter of Franklin,[94] the BIA rejected the respondent’s argument that prior BIA case law established that involuntary manslaughter was not a crime involving moral turpitude, and that his conviction under Missouri’s “involuntary manslaughter” statute also did not involve moral turpitude merely because of the label given that statute.  The BIA held that a “‘black-letter’ holding that convictions for involuntary manslaughter do not constitute crimes involving moral turpitude is not workable.”[95]  Because the elements of the various states’ manslaughter statutes differ, the BIA held that “one must analyze the specific statute under which the alien was convicted on a case-by-case basis in order to determine whether the conviction is for a crime involving moral turpitude.”[96]

            If the statute and judicial decisions defining the offense leave its nature ambiguous, all reasonable doubts must be construed in favor of the noncitizen.[97]  The court must narrowly construe deportation statutes in favor of the noncitizen.[98]  See § 6.7, infra.

[93] See Jeune v. Attorney General, 476 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. Feb. 20, 2007) (Pennsylvania conviction of manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance, in violation of  35 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(30), does not constitute an “aggravated felony” under INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B), for immigration purposes, even though defendant was sentenced under state sentencing statute labelled “drug trafficking,” since statute provided no more than that the defendant was convicted under the statute of the offense of conviction); United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 591-92 (citing United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1969)); United States ex rel. Fontan v. Uhl, 16 F.Supp. 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1936) (holding that the offense, under French law, of not having paid one’s ship passage does not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude, even though designated as a “robbery”); Forbes v. Brownell, 149 F.Supp. 848 (D.D.C. 1957) (the name or label attached to the proscribed conduct does not determine whether the offense involves moral turpitude; the determination of moral turpitude inherent in a conviction of violating a criminal statute must be made from the elements of the offense).  But see United States v. Iniguez-Barba, 485 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. Apr. 25, 2007) (per curiam) (“While we don't look only to the label of the statute at issue to determine what exactly it proscribes, see Fierro-Reyna, 466 F.3d at 326-27, of course we must look to the labels of the statutes to which we compare the statute at issue.”)

[94] Matter of Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec. 867 (BIA 1994).

[95] Id. at 870-871.

[96] Id. at 871.  Compare Matter of Khourn, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1041 (BIA 1997) (finding that conviction for distribution of a controlled substance is a CMT where evil intent is required for conviction) with Matter of Abreu-Semino, 12 I. & N. Dec. 775 (BIA 1968) (finding that conviction for unlawful possession and sale of a controlled substance was not a CMT because intent was not required for a conviction).  Compare Matter of Balao, 20 I. & N. Dec. 440 (BIA 1992) (conviction for passing bad checks not a CMT because intent to defraud not an element of the offense) with Matter of Bart, 20 I. & N. Dec. 436 (BIA 1992) (conviction for passing bad checks a CMT because intent to defraud was an element of the offense).

[97] Matter of H, 7 I. & N. Dec. 616 (BIA 1957).  See also Ablett v. Brownell, 240 F.2d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1957).

[98] Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 459 (1963); Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691, 699 (1958); Barber v. Gonzalez, 347 U.S. 637, 642-643 (1954); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948); Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1975); Matter of Chartier, 16 I. & N. Dec. 284, 287 (BIA 1977); Matter of G, 9 I. & N. Dec. 159, 164 (AG 1961).