Federal immigration law provides penalties for false statements on federal employment eligibility form I-9. Federal law pre-empts state law on this issue. See State v. Reynua, ___ Minn. App. ___ (Ct.App. Dec. 5, 2011) (Immigration Reform and Control Act, INA 274A, 8 U.S.C. 1324a (2006), preempts state prosecution of a job applicant for perjury or forgery involving the I-9 federal form for employment-eligibility verification). Therefore, evidence of false statements on I-9 forms cannot be used in state criminal cases to prosecute defendants for forgery or perjury, because federal statutes pre-empt state legislation on this point.

For example, in State v. Reynua, ___ Minn. App. ___ (Ct.App. Dec. 5, 2011), the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that 8 U.S.C. 1324a (2006) preempts state criminal prosecution of a job applicant for perjury or forgery involving the I-9 federal form for employment-eligibility verification. The court reasoned:

Whether federal law preempts state prosecution is a question of law subject to de novo review. See Thul v. State, 657 N.W.2d 611, 618 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. May 28, 2003). . . .
The I-9 form was developed by the United States Attorney General in compliance with IRCA. See 8 U.S.C. 1324a(b)(1)(A) (requiring attestation by employer of eligibility verification on a form designated or established by the Attorney General by regulation); 8 C.F.R. 274a.2(a) (2005) (noting I-9s designation as the form to be used in employment-eligibility verification system). The I-9 form is entitled Employment Eligibility Verification. On it, Reynua provided the name of Laura Romero, along with a social security number and an address, and submitted in support the Minnesota identification card in Romeros name and a social security card, also in Romeros name. On the form, she checked the box indicating that she is a citizen of the United States. IRCA provides that

[a] form designated or established by the Attorney General under this subsection and any information contained in or appended to such form, may not be used for purposes other than for enforcement of this chapter and sections 1001, 1028, 1546, and 1621 of title 18.

8 U.S.C. 1324a(b)(5).

The state concedes that this provision of IRCA is broad enough to prohibit even use of the I-9 form in a state prosecution for perjury. We agree, given the congressional intent that is evident in this and other provisions in IRCA to preempt the area of employment-related verification of immigration status. IRCA provides that the employment-eligibility verification system may not be used for law enforcement purposes, other than for enforcement of this chapter or the federal perjury and false-statement provisions also referenced in section 1324a(b)(5). 8 U.S.C. 1324a(d)(2)(F). There is also an express provision preempting state laws imposing sanctions upon those who employ, or recruit or refer unauthorized aliens. 8 U.S.C. 1324a(h)(2). This provision clearly does not apply to the prosecution of an applicant for employment, such as Reynua. But it is further evidence of a general congressional intent to preempt state legislation in the area.
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the preemptive effect of IRCA, holding that the law did not preempt Arizonas unauthorized-alien employment law. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011). In dissent, Justice Sotomayor stated that [u]se of the I-9 form is thus limited to federal proceedings, as the majority acknowledges. Id. at 2001. In its opinion, the majority rejected the argument that the Arizona law required an employer to use the I-9 form in order to later claim an affirmative defense. Id. at 1982 n.9. Thus, the majority considered the preemptive effect of section 1324a(b)(5) with respect to sanctions on employers for employing illegal aliens.
The Supreme Court in Whiting was addressing the express preemption of state laws sanctioning employers, and, specifically, the exemption within that preemption provision allowing for state licensing laws. See id. at 1977-78. The Whiting Court was not dealing with federal immigration provisions directed at unauthorized aliens, or employment applicants, but rather an express reservation to the states of licensing provisions directed at employers. See id. at 1987. The Courts opinion does not hold that IRCA lacks a general preemptive intent, and specifically notes the ways in which the state statute at issue conformed to federal law. See id. Thus, there is nothing in the Whiting opinion inconsistent with our conclusion that use of the I-9 form in a state perjury prosecution is preempted by IRCA.

A state law is preempted if the state law obstructs the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of the federal legislation. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248, 104 S. Ct. 615, 621 (1984). IRCA largely targets employers for the sanctions it imposes. Only the federal perjury and false-statement provisions referenced in section 1324a(b)(5) are aimed at the employee. See United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 358 (9th Cir. 2011). But those federal statutes would be enforced by federal authorities, not local prosecutors in 50 different states. And, as the Ninth Circuit noted in United States v. Arizona, the federal act evidences Congress intent that systematic state immigration enforcement will occur under the direction and close supervision of the Attorney General. Id. at 352. The enforcement of Minnesotas perjury statute is not subject to that direction and supervision. Moreover, state perjury prosecutions could shift the illegal-immigration enforcement focus from the employer to the employee. Thus, a Minnesota perjury prosecution for false statements on the I-9 form would tend to obstruct the full purposes and objectives of IRCA.

The same analysis does not apply to the simple-forgery charge based on the use of the Minnesota identification card. Here, we follow the general principle that [w]hen federal laws do preempt conflicting state laws, the state laws are preempted only to the extent that they are in conflict with federal law. Martin ex rel. Hoff v. City of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 2002). IRCA bars use of the I-9 form and any information contained in or appended to such form for purposes other than enforcement of the federal immigration statute and the federal perjury and false-statement provisions. 8 U.S.C. 1324a(b)(5). But we cannot read this provision so broadly as to preempt a state from enforcing its laws relating to its own identification documents.

We conclude that the state, for example, is not barred from prosecuting the crime of display or possession of a fictitious or fraudulently altered Minnesota identification card, Minn. Stat. 171.22, subd. 1(2), merely because that card has been presented in support of an I-9 federal employment-eligibility verification form. There is a general presumption that the historic police powers of the State are not superseded by federal legislation unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008) (quotation omitted). Section 1324a(b)(5) prohibits non-federal use of information appended to the I-9 form. That language does not exhibit a clear and manifest purpose to bar enforcement of state laws pertaining to state identification cards. It would be a significant limitation on state powers to preempt prosecution of state laws prohibiting falsification of state issued identification cards, let alone to prohibit all use of such cards merely because they are also used to support the federal employment-verification application. See generally Minn. Stat. 609.63, subd. 1(1) (prohibiting use of false writing for identification), .652, subd. 2 (prohibiting various acts in creating false identification cards for profit) (2010).

(Id. at ___.) The same reasoning " based on nationwide federal law " would also require the same result in California criminal cases.