decision, the Board agreed with ICE that a returning resident was an applicant for admission under section 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), INA 101(a)(13)(C)(v) because ICE had a reason to believe that the respondent was a trafficker. ICE argued that because it had reason to believe, the respondent had committed an offense an offense identified in section 212(a)(2), and having committed such offense, the respondent was an applicant for admission. The BIA held that 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(2), INA 240(c)(2) puts the burden on a returning LPR to show that he is not an applicant for admission.      The BIA also addressed the meaning of an admission in Matter of Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 616 (BIA 1999), holding that a noncitizen convicted after adjustment is deportable for being convicted after an admission. However, Matter of Kane, 15 I. & N. Dec. 258 (BIA 1975) (recognizing that the government has the burden to prove the grounds of inadmissibility in cases involving a returning LPR) is arguably still good law. This analysis thanks to Dan Kesslebrenner.