The difference between a plea of no contest, or nolo contendere, and a guilty plea is chiefly that the no contest plea may not be used against the defendant in civil proceedings, whereas the guilty plea can. There is no difference between the two pleas insofar as the criminal proceedings are concerned. Therefore, when a defendant is allowed to enter a no contest plea in criminal proceedings, s/he is typically informed that the plea may not be used against him or her in civil proceedings. Immigration proceedings are civil, not criminal, proceedings. In effect, the defendant is informed that the plea does not constitute an admission that may be used in civil immigration proceedings. If the plea is so used, in contradiction to the representation on which the plea was entered, the defendant can move to vacate the criminal conviction on the grounds that the plea was involuntary since it was based on a material misrepresentation as to its effects. In INS v. St. Cyr, 553 U.S. 289, 321-322 (2001), the Supreme Court acknowledged that a plea bargain involves benefits to the defendant, and held that Congress would not be presumed to have intended to deprive the defendant of a benefit (there, eligibility for INA 212(c) relief), on which s/he was entitled to rely at the time the plea was entered. It is fundamental that "a plea that is involuntary, unintelligent, or uninformed is an invalid plea." United States v. Garcia, 401 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2005); citing, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1969); see also, Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213 (1973); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 464-67 (1969). Thus a guilty plea that is obtained through "coercion, terror, inducements, [or] subtle or blatant threats" is involuntary and offensive to due process. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 [fn. omitted]; Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962); Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1995). Even if a plea is entered with full knowledge of its direct consequences, it cannot stand if "induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutors business . . . . " Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 755 (1969) [citation omitted]. It is established in federal law that the immigration effect of a guilty plea is a "collateral" and not a "direct" consequence of the plea. United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and cases cited therein. Thus defense counsels failure to advise the defendant that he or she will be deported is not "ineffective assistance of counsel," and the trial courts failure to do so does not render a plea involuntary. United States v. Fry, 322 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 25-28 (1st Cir. 2000). Yet, as the quoted passage in Brady suggests, and as the federal courts have consistently held over the last three decades, this distinction between "direct" and "collateral" consequences loses all significance when the defendants plea results from affirmative misadvice about its immigration or other effects. See, e.g., United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. George, 869 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Sanclemente-Bejarano, 861 F.2d 206, 211 (9th Cir. 1988); Carter v. McCarthy, 806 F.2d 1373, 1376 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870, (1987); United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 768-769 (11th Cir. 1985); Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1541 (11th Cir. 1985); Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61, 64 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Santelises, 509 F.2d 703, 703-704 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Briscoe, 432 F.2d 1351, 1353-1354 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Khalaf, 116 F.Supp.2d 210 (D. Mass. 1999); United States v. Corona- Maldonado, 46 F.Supp.2d 1171, 1173 (D. Kan 1999); United States v. Mora-Gomez, 875 F. Supp. 1208, 1212 (E.D. Va. 1995); United States v. Nagaro-Garbin, 653 F.Supp. 586, 590 (E.D. Mich 1987), affd, 831 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1987); see also, Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1549, n.5 (11th Cir., 1989), and cases cited therein [discussing the effect of misinformation regarding the "collateral consequence" of parole eligibility on the voluntariness of a plea]. As those and other cases demonstrate, a plea that results from actual misinformation provided to the defendant about its effects is not knowing and voluntary, and cannot be given force.      Applying these principles, the federal courts have consistently voided guilty pleas entered - as this one was - on the basis of affirmative misadvice regarding considerations of consequence to the defendant. For example, in United States v. Toothman, 137 F.3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit held that a plea induced by material misinformation from the prosecution, court, and defense counsel was involuntary. During his plea hearing, Mr. Toothman was advised by his counsel that the sentencing guidelines would fix his sentence at somewhere between 10 to 16 months, and both the governments attorney and the district judge confirmed that defendants understanding. Id. at 1395-97. The subsequent pre-sentence report, however, recommended 199 months. Id. at 1397. After the receipt of the pre-sentence report, the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea; however, the district court denied his motion and sentenced him to 109 months. Id. at 1397-98.      The Ninth Circuit determined that the defendant had been misinformed by the court, government counsel and his own counsel, and held that "[b]ecause of this misinformation, we do not believe Toothman was equipped intelligently to accept the plea offer made to him." Id. at 1400; quoting, United States v. Watley, 987 F.2d 841, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The Court of Appeal accordingly found that the plea was involuntary. Id. at 1401.      Thanks to Don Chairez for the suggestion for this argument.