Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. Dec. 29, 2004) ("The courts that have addressed the question (our court has not) agree that the Boards interpretation of the meaning of "crime involving moral turpitude" is entitled to Chevron deference; see INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425, 143 L. Ed. 2d 590 (1999), where the Supreme Court gave Chevron deference to the Boards interpretation of another term in the immigration statute, "serious nonpolitical crime." But they are divided over whether the Boards decision to classify a particular crime as one involving moral turpitude is entitled to such deference. Compare Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 87 (3d Cir. 2004); Chanmouny v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 810, 811 (8th Cir. 2004), and Cabral v. INS, 15 F.3d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1994), holding that it is, with Smalley v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 332, 336 (5th Cir. 2003), and Rodriguez-Herrera v. INS, 52 F.3d 238 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1995), holding the contrary.").