United States v. Santacruz, 563 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2009) (per curiam) ("The lack of a specific intent requirement in 2252A(a)(5)(B) -which ba rs "knowing[ ]," as opposed to willful, possession of child pornography-does not change this result. Specific intent is not required for a crime to involve moral turpitude. See Nicanor-Romero v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 992, 997 (9th Cir.2008) (recognizing that "a crime may qualify as one of moral turpitude even if the offense is malum prohibitum or does not require the prosecution to establish specific intent"), overruled on other grounds by Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc); Navarro-Lopez, 503 F.3d at 1068 (not listing specific intent as an element of a crime of moral turpitude). Willful, evil intent need not be explicit in the statute if, as here, "such intent is implicit in the nature of the crime." Gonzales-Alvarado v. INS, 39 F.3d 245, 246 (9th Cir.1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted).").