A person who commits a crime involving moral turpitude within five years of last "admission" is deportable if the offense carries a potential sentence of a year. INA 237(a)(2)(A), 8 USC 1227(a)(2)(A). "Admission" is defined by statute as a lawful entry into the United States. See INA 101(a)(13)(A), 8 USC 1101(a)(13)(A). However, the BIA as well as the Ninth Circuit, in Ocampo-Duran v. Ashcroft, have held that where the person had no prior admission (i.e., had entered the U.S. without inspection), the persons adjustment of status to permanent resident would be held to constitute an "admission" for purposes of deportation grounds despite the fact that it contradicts the statutory definition of admission because there is no physical entry into the U.S.[FN1] [FN1: Ocampo-Duran v Ashcroft, 254 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2001); Matter of Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I &N Dec. 616 (BIA 1999). While normally a prior admission is a requirement for adjustment of status, there are several exceptions such as INA245(i), 8 USC 1255(i) for family immigrants who met certain deadlines; adjustment under the former legalization provisions; and adjustment based on status such as asylee, special immigrant juvenile or VAWA.]      In Shivaraman v Ashcroft the Ninth Circuit clarified and limited the Ocampo-Duran rule, addressing its effect on persons who had made a prior admission into the United States. It held that "where an alien is 'admitted' to the United States in accordance with the unambiguous definition of that statutory term as set forth in 101(a)(13)(A), and where he maintains continuous lawful presence in this country thereafter, the date of his lawful entry constitutes the triggering date for purposes of the five-year removal provision" for the moral turpitude deportation ground. Shivaraman v Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 1142, ___ (9th Cir. 2004).      Mr. Shivaraman remained in lawful status from his original admission until the date of his adjustment. The Shivaraman case did not rule on the more common situation, of a person who entered in some lawful status, e.g. a tourist visa, was out of status for some period, and then adjusted status to permanent residency. Persons who were out of status have no guarantee that under Shivaraman their adjustment of status to permanent residency will be held not to re-start the five year clock for the moral turpitude deportation ground.      However, persons who fell out of status between admission and adjustment have a strong argument that the rationale of Shivaraman also applies to them, and they should not be held to have made a new admission when they adjust status. The Ninth Circuit emphasized two reasons for its decision in Shivaraman, both of which would apply regardless of whether the person maintained status between initial admission and adjustment of status. First, the Court stated that it wanted to avoid a situation in which an IJ or BIA could arbitrarily choose among several possible dates of admission. "For aliens like Shivaraman, who, under the Boards construction, would have two or more possible dates of admission from which time could accrue, the Boards decision allows for an IJs exercise of unbounded discretion with disparate effects and drastic immigration consequences. Even under different circumstances, in cases in which the definition of admission might be deemed to be ambiguous, such a rule would not constitute a permissible interpretation of the statutory term." Shivaraman v Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 1142, ___ (9th Cir. 2004).      Second, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that in Ocampo-Duran it had been compelled to depart from the clear language of the statute (which provides that an admission is a physical entry into the U.S.) only in order to avoid an absurd result, i.e., to avoid holding that a person who entered without inspection and then adjusted status to permanent residency never had been admitted to the United States and therefore was not subject to the grounds of deportation. In doing that, however, "our decision, both in its language and its logic, recognized section 101(a)(13)(A) as the primary, controlling definition of the statutory term." No such "absurd result" needs to be avoided in the case of a noncitizen who had an initial admission at the border, fell out of status, and then adjusted status; the person does have an admission, and is subject to the grounds of deportability. Thanks to Kathy Brady for this analysis.