Negrete-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 2008) ("Negrete contends that, even if we accept the Board's interpretation of 101(a)(43)(E)(ii) in Vasquez-Muniz II, the application of that interpretation to his case had an impermissible retroactive effect and therefore violated his due process rights. Negrete asserts that such a change in interpretation must take place through notice-and-comment rulemaking rather than through adjudication. We find Negrete's retroactivity argument unpersuasive. An agency is not precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding rather than through notice-and-comment rule-making. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) ("[T]he choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency."); see also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 294-95, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974). "An administrative agency may not apply a new rule retroactively when to do so would unduly intrude upon reasonable reliance interests. " State of Ill. v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 288, 292 (7th Cir.1986) (quoting Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 104 S.Ct. 2218, 81 L.Ed.2d 42 (1984)). Nevertheless, Negrete has not shown that he had any "reasonable reliance interests" that were intruded upon by the Board's change of course. . . .").