Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. ___,127 S.Ct. 638 (Dec. 5, 2006) (the language in the aggravated felony definition including certain state convictions "has two perfectly straightforward jobs to do: it provides that a generic description of "an offense . . . in this paragraph," one not specifically couched as a state offense or a federal one, covers either one, and it confirms that a state offense whose elements include the elements of a felony punishable under the CSA is an aggravated felony.").



     Footnote 6 in Lopez indicates that INA 101(a)(43)(B) -- the drug trafficking crime prong -- indicates some state convictions are included as drug trafficking crimes in 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(2) and therefore in 101(a)(43)(B), but that's a separate question from the question whether the sentence at the foot of 101(a)(43) after (U) means that all the aggravated felony categories, even those defined by reference to a specific federal statute, include state analogues. The post-U language can be explained as necessary to clarify that (B) includes some state offenses, and that the generic "murder"-type offenses include state offenses, without forcing the conclusion that the offenses defined in terms of specific federal statutes include state analogues as well. Can you really say that a state offense is "described in" a federal statute? There is a perfectly good plain meaning argument that it is not.