Huerta-Guevara v. Ashcroft, 321 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. March 4, 2003)(Arizona conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle, in violation of A.R.S. 13-1802, did not qualify as a theft offense conviction under the generic definition of "theft offense" adopted in Corona-Sanchez v. INS, 291 F.3d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 2002)(en banc), or an offense of receipt of stolen property, and was thus not an aggravated felony, since it is a divisible statute, four parts of which do not require intent and which criminalizes theft of services and aiding and abetting theft of services and the record of conviction does not establish that respondent knew the vehicle was stolen or possessed it with criminal intent).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0270454p.pdf This decision stands for a number of important propositions: (1) A concession before the immigration court does not obviate the right to challenge or obtain a ruling on whether a conviction constitutes an aggravated felony when it is a pure matter of law on which the appellate court can rule;
(2) The Arizona theft statute prohibits theft of services as well as property, and is thus overbroad and divisible with respect to the aggravated felony definition of a theft offense;
(3) The label placed upon an offense by the state statutory scheme is not controlling, for purposes of determining whether the offense triggers removal;
(4) The intervening en banc decision in United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) establishes the definition of a theft-related offense for purposes of determining whether a conviction constitutes an aggravated felony conviction;
(5) The record of conviction does not indicate that the defendant was convicted of possessing the essential intent element as required by Hernandez-Mancilla v. INS, 246 F.3d 1002 (7th Cir. 2001) (merging the dictionary and MPC definitions);
(6) A statement in an appellate brief suggesting that taking employer's car with intent to return it is an insufficient basis from which to infer intent cannot be taken as a factual concession of the conduct of which the noncitizen had been convicted; as with a statement underlying the facts recounted in the PSR, it is not clear that these facts are those to which she pled guilty. It is not what she did but the crime of which she was convicted that is decisive for immigration purposes