Fourth Degree assault under RCW 9A.36.041constitutes a divisible statute with respect to falling within the crime of violence aggravated felony deportation ground. In State v. Davis, 60 W. App. 813, 821 (1991), the court held: "[F]ourth degree assault [in Washington] is not defined by statute and can be committed in three different ways: (1) intending to inflict bodily injury on another, accompanied with the apparent present ability to do so, (2) intentionally creating in another person reasonable apprehension and fear of bodily injury, and (3) intentionally committing an unlawful touching, regardless whether physical harm results. See WPIC 35.50." The reference is to the Washington Pattern Jury Instructions, WPIC 35.50. The third alternative offense contained within this divisible statute does not appear to be sufficiently violent to constitute a crime of violence or crime of domestic violence, within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 16(a). See United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. Aug 11, 2003).