Matter of Vargas-Sarmiento, 23 I. & N. Dec. 651 (BIA 2004) (New York conviction of first-degree manslaughter, in violation of Penal Law 125.20(1) and (2), constitutes a crime of violence and therefore an aggravated felony for immigration purposes, under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)(2000), reasoning that acting with intent to cause serious physical injury or death to a person "by its nature involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense," under 18 U.S.C. 16(b)(2000)); see Chery v. Ashcroft, 347 F.3d 404 (2d Cir. 2003); Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 2003); Chrzanoski v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 2003); but see Jobson v. Ashcroft, 326 F.3d 367 (2d Cir. 2003). NOTE: This BIA decision confuses the intent required to constitute the offense with the statutory requirement that intentional force must be the means by which the offense is committed, and may be vulnerable to being overruled under the reasoning of Jobson, supra.