Plasencia-Ayala v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2008) (Nevada conviction of failure to register as a sex offender, in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 179D.550, does not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude within the meaning of INA 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), because the offense of conviction is a strict liability offense without any intent requirement), following Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688, 693 (9th Cir. 2007); Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 2004) ("crimes deemed not to involve moral turpitude ...

Garcia-Meza v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. Feb. 5, 2008) (Illinois conviction of "aggravated battery of a police officer," in violation of 720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(6), did not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude, because the minimum conduct includes spitting on a police officer and other de minimus conduct).

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - ASSAULT - SECOND DEGREE
Singh v. USDHS, 517 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. Feb. 29, 2008) (New York conviction of second degree assault, under New York Penal Law 120.05, is a divisible statute; a conviction of violating NYPL 120.05(4) is not a crime of moral turpitude), following Gill v. INS, 420 F.3d 82, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that N.Y.P.L. 120.05(4) is not a crime of moral turpitude because it requires only that the defendant acted with attempted recklessness instead of specific intent).

United States v. Franco-Fernandez, 511 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. Jan. 2, 2008) (Illinois offense of "putative father" child abduction, in violation of 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5(b)(3), is neither a crime of violence nor an aggravated felony for purposes of the increased offense levels specified in U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) and (b)(1)(C) for illegal reentry after deportation).

Arce-Vences v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. Dec. 21, 2007) ("Arce's conviction for possession [of between 50 and 2000 pounds] of marijuana is not an aggravated felony. Commission of an aggravated felony was the sole charge on which he was ordered removed. Because, in the light of Lopez, we hold that Arce's conviction for possession of marijuana is not an aggravated felony, we vacate his order of removal.").

Vizcarra-Ayala v. Mukasey, __ F.3d __, 2008 WL 184954 (9th Cir. Jan. 23, 2008) (California conviction for violation of California Penal Code 475(c) is not categorically an aggravated felony offense "related to" forgery, because the statute encompasses real, unaltered documents, and thus falls outside the generic definition of "forgery" applied to the aggravated felony category).

Matter of Carachuri-Rosendo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 382, 389 (BIA Dec. 13, 2007) (en banc) ("facts leading to recidivist felony punishment, such as the existence of a prior conviction, do not qualify as "elements" in the traditional sense. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228-35 (1998).").

Matter of Carachuri-Rosendo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 382, 393 n.8 (BIA Dec. 13, 2007) (en banc) ("Aliens in removal proceedings have no constitutional right to appointed counsel, so allowing facts about recidivism to be determined by an Immigration Judge in the first instance could raise due process concerns. Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443, 447 (1962) (finding that due process requires the appointment of counsel to a defendant charged as an habitual offender under Virginia law in light of the complexity of the recidivism issue).").

Allen v. Siebert, 128 S.Ct. 2 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 2007) (when a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, "that [is] the end of the matter" for purposes of tolling the AEDPA's 1-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition, and the inquiry does not turn on the nature of the particular time limit relied upon by the state court at issue).

Rebilas v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 2007) (Arizona conviction of attempted public sexual indecency to a minor, in violation of ARS 13-1001 and 13-1403(B), includes conduct that falls outside the federal definition of attempted sexual abuse of a minor under INA 101(a)(43)(A), (U), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A) and (U); statute includes acts that do not involve touching or knowledge of the child, and therefore do not involve sexual abuse of a minor). Note: the court examined Arizona state caselaw, applying Duenas.