United States v. Servin-Acosta, 534 F.3d 1362 (10th Cir. Jul. 30, 2008) (California conviction for robbery, in violation of Penal Code 211, is not categorically a generic "robbery" offense, and thus a crime of violence, under USSG 2L1.2(b), for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes; Penal Code 211 is broader than generic robbery in that it includes the use of force in escaping after the taking has occurred), agreeing with United States v. Becerril-Lopez, 528 F.3d 1133, 1140-42 (9th Cir. 2008).

United States v. Cepeda-Rios, 530 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. Jun. 4, 2008) (California conviction of sale of tar heroin, in violation of Health & Safety Code 11352, constituted a drug trafficking aggravated felony for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes; although misdemeanor possessory offense is not an aggravated felony by itself, because the conviction was a misdemeanor, defendants prior drug conviction made the conviction a felony under the hypothetical federal prosecution analysis; court did not address argument that prior must be proven in subsequent conviction), following United States v.

Penuliar v. Ashcroft, 528 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. Jun. 10, 2008) (California conviction for violation of California Vehicle Code 10851, unlawful driving of a motor vehicle, is not categorically an aggravated felony "theft" offense for immigration purposes, since that statutes includes accessories after the fact), following United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2007)

People v. Wilkinson, 163 Cal.App.4th 1554 (Cal.App. 3 Dist. Jun.18, 2008) (California case prosecuting defendant for violation of Penal Code 459, burglary, where defendant entered into bedroom of roommate to download images from roommates computer).

United States v. Becerril-Lopez, 541 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2008) (California conviction of robbery, in violation of Penal Code 211, constituted crime of violence under USSG 2L1.2(b), because the elements of the offense meet the generic definition of "extortion," one of the enumerated crimes of violence; California Penal Code 211 is does not categorically meet the generic definition of "robbery."), distinguishing United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 574 (9th Cir.

United States v. Becerril-Lopez, 528 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. Jun. 12, 2008) (generic definition of extortion: "obtaining something of value from another with is consent induced by the wrongful use of force, fear, or threats."; extortion includes threats to property and non-immediate danger), citing Scheidler v. Natl Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 409 (2003).

Rashid v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. Jun. 26, 2008) (Michigan conviction of possession of a controlled substance, where the defendant has a prior conviction for the same offense, is not an aggravated felon under INA 101(a)(43)(B) for immigration purposes; "The first and only hypothetical that should be considered under the hypothetical federal felony approach is whether the crime that an individual was actually convicted of would be a felony under federal law.

Matter of Gonzalez-Zoquiapan, 24 I. & N. Dec. 549 (BIA Jun. 25, 2008) (California conviction for violation of California Penal Code 647(b), disorderly conduct involving solicitation of a prostitute does not fall within INA 212(a)(2)(D)(ii) ground of inadmissibility [procuring a prostitute]; that ground only applies to persons who engage in the business of obtaining prostitutes for use by others, not to isolated incidents of people hiring a prostitute; because soliciting a prostitute does not trigger INA 212(a)(2)(D), it does not bar good moral character on that basis).

Matter of Gonzalez-Zoquiapan, 24 I. & N. Dec. 549 (BIA Jun. 25, 2008) (California conviction for violation of California Penal Code 647(b), disorderly conduct, is broader than the prostitution ground of inadmissibility; the phrase "engage in prostitution" for purposes of INA 212(a)(2)(D) means to engage in a pattern or practice of sexual intercourse for financial or other material gain; the phrase does not encompass isolated incidents or sexual contact that falls short of intercourse).

Mandujano-Real v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 585 (9th Cir. May 22, 2008) (Oregon conviction of identity theft, under Oregon Revised Statute 165.800, did not categorically qualify as an aggravated felony theft offense, under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), for purposes of removal, because use of a false identity does not deprive anyone of "ownership" and the statute punishes use of another persons identity even if that the use was with consent).