A conviction of money laundering, under 18 U.S.C. 1956, 1957, should not be considered a drug trafficking aggravated felony. It is certainly not a drug trafficking crime, under the second theory, since it cannot be considered a "felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or Chapter 705 of Title 46." (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(2), referred to in INA 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B).

United States v. Maroquin-Bran, 587 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. Nov. 9, 2009) (California conviction for violation of Health & Safety Code 11360(a) is not necessary a "drug trafficking offense" for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since the statute of conviction is divisible and includes transportation for personal use); accord, United States v. Medina-Almaguer, 559 F.3d 420, 422-23 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Lopez-Salas, 513 F.3d 174, 177-78, 180 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); United States v. Garcia-Medina, 497 F.3d 875, 877 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v.

Counsel can argue that a federal conviction of bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1344(b) ("false or fraudulent" representations) might not be CMT under the reasoning of Hirsch v.INS, 308 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1962). There are circumstances in which one could obtain property under the control of the bank (e.g., from one's own safe deposit box), under false, but not fraudulent pretences, (e.g., saying I lost the key, where in fact, estranged wife had taken it to prevent sale of assets before court injunction could be obtained).
In Matter of Espinosa 10 I. & N. Dec.

Carrillo-Jaime v. Holder, 572 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. Jul. 15, 2009) (California conviction of owning and operating a chop shop, in violation of Vehicle Code 10801 ("premises where any person has been engaged in altering, destroying, disassembling, dismantling, reassembling, or storing any motor vehicle or motor vehicle part known to be illegally obtained by theft, fraud, or conspiracy to defraud"), did not constitute a theft aggravated felony within the meaning of INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C.

Nguyen v. Holder, 571 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. Jul. 2, 2009) (California conviction of auto theft, in violation of what is now codified at Penal Code 487(d)(i) (any person who (1) takes possession; (2) of an automobile; (3) owned or possessed by another; (4) by means of trespass and (5) with intent to permanently deprive the owner of such property; and (6) carries the automobile away), does not constitute a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), and is therefore not an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

United States v. Santacruz, 563 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2009) (per curiam) (federal conviction of possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

Dean v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 1849 (Apr. 29, 2009) (unintentional or accidental discharge of firearm during violent or drug-trafficking offense is sufficient to warrant 10-year mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(iii)).



Therefore, this enhancement does not convert the substantive offense into an aggravated felony crime of violence because the intent required for this sentence enhancement is insufficient under Leocal to constitute a crime of violence.

United States v. Munoz-Ortenza, __ F.3d __, 2009 WL 693146 (5th Cir. Mar. 18, 2009) (California conviction for oral copulation of a minor, in violation of Penal Code 288a(b)(1), was not necessarily "sexual abuse of a minor," and thus not a "crime of violence" for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since the offense may be committed against a person under 18, while the minor must be under 16 to qualify as "sexual abuse of a minor."), following United States v. Lopez-DeLeon, 513 F.3d 472 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 128 S.Ct.

United States v. Munoz-Ortenza, __ F.3d __, 2009 WL 693146 (5th Cir. Mar. 18, 2009) (California conviction for oral copulation of a minor, in violation of Penal Code 288a(b)(1), was not necessarily "sexual abuse of a minor," and thus not a "crime of violence" for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since the offense may be committed against a person under 18, while the minor must be under 16 to qualify as "sexual abuse of a minor."), following United States v. Lopez-DeLeon, 513 F.3d 472 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 128 S.Ct.

18 U.S.C. 1952 ("travels . . . or uses the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, within intent do (1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity."), by it minimum conduct is arguably not controlled substances offense or a crime involving moral turpitude (the funds may have been obtained through non-CMT activity and be distributed for non-CMT purposes).
Thanks to Jonathan Moore.