There are strong arguments that Penal Code 136.1(b)(1) is not obstruction of justice. Section 32 was held obstruction because it requires the specific intent to prevent the criminal from undergoing arrest, trial or punishment. Section 136.1(b)(1) lacks specific intent to protect the criminal or thwart the judicial process.

Borrome v. Attorney General of the United States, 687 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. Jul. 18, 2012) (federal conviction for unauthorized wholesale distribution in interstate commerce of prescription drugs, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 331(t), 353(e), is not a drug trafficking aggravated felony).

United States v. Griffin, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (7th Cir., Jul. 5, 2012) (reversing federal conviction for felon in possession of firearms where there was no evidence defendant intended to exercise any control over his father's firearms in his parents' home where he went to live after being released from prison: a defendant's strong connection to the residence alone does not suffice to establish the nexus required to prove his constructive possession of a gun found in the residence.").

Ruiz-Lopez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 513, *520 (6th Cir. Jun.

Ruiz-Lopez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 513, *518 (6th Cir. Jun. 19, 2012) (Washington conviction of felony flight from an officer, in violation of Washington Revised Code 46.61.024, may or may not categorically rise to the level of a crime of moral turpitude: We express no opinion regarding whether flight accompanied by only a reckless mens rea also categorically meets the BIA's definition of a CIMT [applicable to convictions after the most recent amendment in 2003 lowered the mens rea to recklessness for the third element of this offense].).

Matter of Castro-Rodriguez, 25 I&N Dec. 698 (BIA 2012) (remanding case to IJ to allow respondent to present factual evidence that Virginia conviction of possession with the intent to give or distribute less than one-half ounce of marijuana, in violation of Va. Rev. Stat. 18.2-248.1(a)(1), involved only gratuitous distribution of a small amount of marijuana); following Matter of Aruna, 24 I&N Dec. 452 (BIA 2008) (the federal felony conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance offense, 21 U.S.C.

Akinsade v. Holder, 678 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. May 1, 2012) (federal conviction for embezzlement by a bank employee under 18 U.S.C. 656, did not categorically constitute a fraud aggravated felony, for purposes of deportation, where none of the facts to which the petitioner actually and necessarily pleaded to establish whether that offense was committed with a specific intent to defraud).

Singh v. Att'y General, 677 F.3d 503 (3d Cir. Apr. 16, 2012) (federal conviction of knowingly making a false statement under penalty of perjury in a bankruptcy proceeding in violation of 18 U.S.C. 152(3), did not trigger removal-deportation as an aggravated felony fraud conviction, because government failed to show that actual loss to the victim exceeded $10,000.00).

NOTE: This case agrees with Pierre v. Holder 588 F.3d 767 (2d Cir.

United States v. Onyesoh, 674 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. Apr. 4, 2012) (reversing federal conviction for access device fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1029, for lack of proof of essential element that unauthorized "access devices" were be usable; and government did not provide any evidence of usability of the expired credit card numbers).

People v. Wolcott, 34 Cal.3d 92, 99-100, 665 P.2d 520 (July 7, 1983) (California conviction of robbery, in violation of Penal Code 211, does not require as an element either an attempt to inflict a violent injury, or the present ability to do so: it is defined by statute as the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.