Ramos v. U.S. Attorney General, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2013 WL 599552 (11th Cir. Feb. 19, 2013) (an aggravated felony theft offense, under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), is defined as: the taking of property ... with the criminal intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent.); quoting Gonzales v. Duenas"Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 189, 127 S.Ct. 815, 819"20, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007).

The Supreme Court has held that "[T]he well-settled meaning of 'fraud' require[s] a misrepresentation or concealment of material fact" and "materiality of falsehood is an element of the federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes." Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 23, 25 (1999).

Patel v. Holder, 707 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. Feb. 1, 2013) (Connecticut conviction of fourth degree larceny under Conn. Gen.Stat. 53a"125, is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude because the offense may be committed without intent to permanently deprive).

Patel v. Holder, 707 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. Feb. 1, 2013) (Connecticut conviction of fourth degree larceny under Conn. Gen.Stat. 53a"125, is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude because the offense may be committed without intent to permanently deprive).

Ramos v. U.S. Attorney General, 709 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. Feb.

Ramos v. U.S. Attorney General, 709 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. Feb. 19, 2013) (an aggravated felony theft offense, under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), is defined as: the taking of property ... with the criminal intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent.); quoting Gonzales v. Duenas"Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 189, 127 S.Ct. 815, 819"20, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007).

18 U.S.C. 547. Depositing goods in buildings on boundaries, punishes [w]hoever receives or deposits any merchandise in any building upon the boundary line between the United States and any foreign country, or carries any merchandise through the same, in violation of law This offense constitutes a regulatory offense, that is not a crime of moral turpitude. See N. TOOBY, ET AL., TOOBYS CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE 8.22 (2008). There is nothing inherently evil about taking goods across a border in violation of an unspecified law.

People v. Mitchell, 209 Cal.App.4th 1364, 148 Cal.Rptr.3d 33 (Oct. 11, 2012) (former Penal Code 12020(a)(4), which prohibited the carrying of a concealed dirk or dagger, does not require specific intent to conceal the instrument from other persons).

Campbell v. Holder, 698 F.3d 29, *31 (1st Cir. Oct. 19, 2012) (Connecticut conviction of risk of injury to a minor under of the Connecticut General Statutes 53"21(a)(1) (penalizing [a]ny person who ...

Sanchez-Avalos v. Holder, 693 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 2012) (California conviction of sexual battery, in violation of Penal Code 243.4(a), did not categorically constitute a sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony, because the elements do not require that the victim be a minor, and the evidence admissible under the modified categorical analysis did not establish that the victim was a minor).