Felony and Misdemeanor Federal Chart as prepared by Federal Defender office:
http://ms.fd.org/maxpenalties/maxpenalties.pdf

This file summarizes developments occurring from Apr. 1-30, 2016.

Mena v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 1660166 (4th Cir. Apr. 27, 2016) (federal conviction of violating 18 U.S.C. 659, second paragraph (purchase, receipt, or possession of property that has moved in interstate or foreign commerce knowing the same to have been embezzled or stolen), was not categorically an aggravated felony theft offense, under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C.

Chavez-Solis v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. Oct.

Levesque v. Lynch, 802 F.3d 152, 154 (1st Cir. Sept. 18, 2015) (only foreign convictions for which the term of imprisonment was completed after the previous 15 years are excluded from the aggravated felony definition; the exclusion does not apply to federal and state convictions).

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2251 (2015), strongly supports the argument that 18 U.S.C. 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague. The question remains, however, whether the Board of Immigration Appeals (as distinct from a federal court) has authority to find 16(b) to be unconstitutionally vague.

Quijada-Aguilar v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 5103038 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 2015) (California conviction for voluntary manslaughter, under Penal Code 192(a), did not qualify as a particularly serious crime that would render noncitizen ineligible for withholding of removal, since it did not constitute an aggravated felony crime of violence, because it encompassed reckless conduct).

Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2015) (California theft conviction, including any offense for which the underlying substantive offense charged was a violation of Penal Code 484, is not aggravated felony theft, since because the California definition of theft includes theft of labor, false credit reporting, and theft by false pretenses, which do not fall within the definition of aggravated felony theft).

Madrigal-Barcenas v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 4716767 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2015) (Nevada drug paraphernalia conviction, under NRSA 453.566, constitutes a controlled substance conviction, for purposes of inadmissibility, only if the conviction involved a substance criminalized by federal drug laws); following Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2828 (2015); holding Luu-Le v. INS, 224 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 2000) and its progeny are no longer good law.

Ortiz v. Lynch, __ F.3d __ (8th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015) (Minnesota conviction for violation of Minn.Stat. 609.50, subd. 2(2), obstruction of legal process, is not an aggravated felony crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), INA 101(a)(43)(F), since the minimum amount of force required to sustain a conviction under the obstruction of legal process is not violent force as required by 18 U.S.C. 16).

A conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol, with a great bodily injury clause under Penal Code 21022.7, should not be considered to be an aggravated felony crime of violence, even if a one year sentence is imposed. This is because there is no intent required for the GBI clause beyond the intent required to commit the underlying offense. People v. Poroj (2010) 190 CA4th 165 (jury instructions for DUI with 12022.7 GBI enhancement do not require the jury to find intent to cause GBI separate and apart from intent necessary to commit underlying crime); People v. Carter (1998) 60 Cal.