False Bank Entries, 18 U.S.C. 1005
Statute is divisible and criminalizes false bank entries made with the "intent to injure or defraud." Immigration counsel might argue that guilty plea to an offense committed solely with "intent to injure" is not a crime involving moral turpitude: it cannot be fraud since "intent to injury" would then be redundant.

United States v. Vidal-Mendoza, ___ F.Supp.3d ___, 2011 WL 1560987 (D.Or. Apr. 25, 2011) (Oregon conviction of rape in the third degree, under Or. Rev. Statute 163.355 [sexual intercourse with another person under 16 years of age.], held not categorically an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), because the Oregon statute allows for a conviction if the person has sexual intercourse with another person under 16 years of age, O.R.S. 163.355(1), which is broader than the elements of sexual abuse of a minor as defined in federal criminal law at 18 U.S.C.

United States v. Kasenge, 660 F.3d 537 (1st Cir. Nov. 2, 2011) (federal offense of aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028A, does not require theft, or any other illicit method of procurement, of the means of identification).

Prus v. Holder, 660 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. Sept. 28, 2011) (New York conviction for promoting prostitution in the third degree, under New York Penal Law 20.00 and 230.25, does not constitute an aggravated felony within the meaning of INA 101(a)(43)(K)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(K)(i), because New York law defines prostitution more broadly than the generic federal definition of this aggravated felony offense).

Prus v. Holder, 660 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. Sept. 28, 2011) (per curiam) (prostitution in INA 101(a)(43)(K)(i) refers to promiscuous sexual intercourse for hire.); deferring to Matter of Gonzales"Zoquiapan, 24 I & N Dec. 549, 553 (BIA 2008) (prostitution in INA 212(a)(2)(D), which relates to the inadmissibility of aliens entering the United States to engage in prostitution, means promiscuous sexual intercourse for hire. 22 C.F.R. 40.24(b).).

Doe v. Attorney General, 659 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) (in evaluating the amount of loss to the victim in excess of $10,000, necessary to establish an aggravated felony fraud offense, under INA 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), a court must limit itself to consideration of the loss tethered to the alien's specific offense of conviction.); see Alaka v. Att'y Gen., 456 F.3d 88, 106 (3d Cir.2006) (it was legal error for the IJ to consider the amount of intended loss for all of the charges rather than the single count for which she was convicted.); Nijhawan v.

Doe v. Attorney General, 659 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) (Rodov pled guilty not to a single fraudulent transaction but to aiding and abetting the whole of a large-scale criminal endeavor, so the record established the loss from the offense of conviction was in excess of $10,000, sufficient to establish that the offense was an aggravated felony fraud offense under INA 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)); see Khalayleh v. INS, 287 F.3d 978, 980 (10th Cir. 2002) (Count Two of the indictment did not allege a discrete fraud involving only the $9,308 check.

United States v. Rivera, 658 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 2011) (California felony petty theft convictions under Penal Code 484(a) and 666 constituted aggravated felony theft offenses, under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes); declining to follow United States v. Corona"Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); following United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S.

United States v. Rivera, 658 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 2011)(California conviction of theft, in violation of Penal Code 484(a), does not categorically constitute an aggravated felony theft offense, under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), because it penalizes additional conduct that is not encompassed within the aggravated felony theft definition, such as theft of labor, false credit reporting, and theft by false pretenses); citing Carrillo"Jaime v.

United States v. Rivera, 658 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 2011) (the generic definition an aggravated felony theft offense, under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), is [1] a taking of property or an exercise of control over property [2] without consent [3] with the criminal intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent. ); quoting Carrillo"Jaime v. Holder, 572 F.3d 747, 750 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Corona"Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc).