Matter of Sierra, 26 I & N Dec. 288, 292 (BIA 2014) (Nevada conviction of attempted possession of a stolen vehicle, in violation of Nevada Revised Statute 193.330 and 205.273, was not categorically an aggravated felony as an attempted theft offense, because Nevada law does not require actual knowledge that the property had been stolen, but only reason to believe; aggravated felony theft ground requires intent to deprive, which can be inferred from actual knowledge, but not from reason to believe); citing Matter of Garcia-Madruga, 24 I & N Dec.

Sarmientos v. Holder, 742 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. Feb. 12, 2014) (Florida conviction of delivery of cocaine, in violation of Florida Statute 893.13(1)(a)(1)(sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance), is not a categorical aggravated felony drug trafficking offense, since Florida statute does not require knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance, while federal offense requires knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance); see State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412, 415"16 (Fla.

Turijan v. Holder, 744 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2014) (California conviction of felony false imprisonment, in violation of Penal Code 236, 237 [deprivation of liberty of another by violence or menace], was not a categorical crime of moral turpitude, because it does not require the intent to injure, actual injury, or a protected class of victim, and California courts have applied the statute to conduct that is not morally turpitudinous); following Castrijon"Garcia v. Holder, 704 F.3d 1205, 1218 (9th Cir.

Sarmientos v. Holder, 742 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. Feb. 12, 2014) (Florida conviction of delivery of cocaine, in violation of Florida Statute 893.13(1)(a)(1)(sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance), is not a categorical aggravated felony drug trafficking offense, since Florida statute does not require knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance, while federal offense requires knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance); see State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412, 415"16 (Fla.

Matter of Sierra, 26 I & N Dec. 288, 292 (BIA 2014) (Nevada conviction of attempted possession of a stolen vehicle, in violation of Nevada Revised Statute 193.330 and 205.273, was not categorically an aggravated felony as an attempted theft offense, because Nevada law does not require actual knowledge that the property had been stolen, but only reason to believe; aggravated felony theft ground requires intent to deprive, which can be inferred from actual knowledge, but not from reason to believe); citing Matter of Garcia-Madruga, 24 I & N Dec.

Murillo-Prado v. Holder, 735 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 2013) (Arizona conviction for racketeering, in violation of Ariz.Rev.Stat. 13"2301, is not categorically a RICO aggravated felony offense, because Arizona's definition of racketeering includes two offenses not explicitly listed in its federal counterpart: (1) [i]ntentional or reckless false statements or publications concerning land for sale or lease or sale of subdivided lands or sale and mortgaging of unsubdivided lands, and (2) making [o]bscene or indecent telephone communications to minors for commercial purposes,).

United States v. Liu, 731 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. Oct. 1, 2013) (federal conviction of copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. 506(a) requires proof that defendant knew he was acting illegally, rather than simply knew he was making copies; knowingly trafficking in counterfeit labels under 18 U.S.C. 2318(a)(1) requires knowledge that the labels were counterfeit).

Murillo-Prado v. Holder, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 2013) (Arizona conviction for illegally conducting an enterprise is not categorically an aggravated felony RICO conviction, but the record of conviction established respondent was convicted of aggravated felony racketeering).

Note: This holding may be inconsistent with Bautista v. Atty Gen. of the U.S., ___ F.3d ___ (3d Cir. Feb. 21, 2014)(New York conviction of attempted arson in the third degree, in violation of Penal Law 110 and 150.10, did not categorically constitute a match for the elements of 18 U.S.C.

United States v. Rangel-Cataneda, __ F.3d __, No. 12-4408 (4th Cir. Mar. 7, 2013) (Tennessee aggravated statutory rape conviction under Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-506(c) is not categorically a crime of violence for illegal re-entry purposes, because Tennessee sets the age of consent at eighteen).

Ramos v. U.S. Attorney General, ___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL 599552 (11th Cir. Feb.