While false personation, in violation of Penal Code 529(3), is arguably not a crime of moral turpitude, since fraud is not a required element of the offense, People v. Rathert, 24 Cal.4th 200 (2000), the offense may qualify as an aggravated felony "fraud or deceit" offense under INA 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) if there is a loss to the victim exceeding $10,000.

United States v. Cervantes-Blanco, 504 F.3d 576 (5th Cir. Oct. 12, 2007) (Colorado conviction for attempted second-degree kidnapping, in violation of C.R.S. 18-3-302(1), is not a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes; the generic definition of kidnapping requires (1) knowing removal or confinement, (2) substantial interference with the victim's liberty, and (3) force, threat, or fraud, while the Colorado kidnapping statute does not require a substantial interference with the victims liberty), following United States v. Iniguez-Barba, 485 F.3d 790, 791-93 (5th Cir.

A California conviction for unauthorized driving, in violation of Vehicle Code 10851, is a good potential safe haven plea that should not constitute a CMT conviction or perhaps an aggravated felony conviction. Depending upon the record of conviction, the offense may be committed with intent to "temporarily deprive" an owner of property, which traditionally is not a CMT.

United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. Oct. 10, 2007) (9-6 en banc) (California conviction for unlawful driving or taking of vehicle, under Penal Code 10851(a), did not categorically qualify as an aggravated felony theft offense under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) for purposes of enhancement of illegal reentry sentence, since the offense includes accessory after the fact, which is not listed in INA 101(a)(43)(U), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) as an aggravated felony inchoate offense).

Quintero- Salazar v. Keisler, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 2916162 (9th Cir. Oct.

Dulal-Whiteway v. US Dep't of Homeland Sec., 501 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2007) (federal conviction of using unauthorized access devices to obtain things of value aggregating $1000 or more, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(2), may be an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)).

Henry v. BICE, 493 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. Jul. 11, 2007) (New York conviction for possession of a loaded firearm with intent to use it unlawfully against another person, under New York Penal Law 265.03, constitutes a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b) and is therefore an aggravated felony for immigration purposes).

United States v. Shea, 493 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. July 11, 2007) (18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) punishes any person who "knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer").

People v. Hering, 20 Cal.4th 440, 976 P.2d 210 (1999) (Bus. & Prof. Code, 650, and Ins. Code, 750, punishing offering rebates on medical fees as inducement referral of patients, does not require any evil intent). This offense therefore should not be considered a crime of moral turpitude.

United States v. Savage, 488 F.3d 1232, ___, (9th Cir. Jun. 12, 2007) (Montana conviction of escape, in violation of Montana Code Annotated 45-7-306(2) (escape includes purposeful "fail[ure] to return to official detention following temporary leave granted for a specific purpose or limited time" as well as "knowingly or purposely elud[ing] official detention."), constitutes a crime of violence under U.S.S.G.