14
United States v. Rayo-Valdez, 302 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. Aug.
12, 2002) (Texas conviction for aggravated sexual assault
on a minor under 14, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 22.021,
constituted a crime of violence, and was thus an aggravated
felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F),
to enhance a sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 for illegal re-entry).

United States v. Gracia-Cantu,
302 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. Aug. 9, 2002) (Texas conviction of
injury to child, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 22.04(a),
was not "crime of violence," and so did not qualify
as an "aggravated felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) for illegal re-entry sentence enhancement
purposes).

United States v. Charles, 301 F.3d
309 (5th Cir. July 31, 2002) (en banc) (Texas conviction of
simple motor vehicle theft was not a crime of violence under
U.S.S.G.

United States v.
Cervantes-Nava, 281 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. Feb. 4, 2002), cert.
denied, 122 S.Ct. 2379 (2002) (Texas conviction of driving
while intoxicated was not a crime of violence aggravated felony,
under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), warranting
increase in base offense level for illegal re-entry offense).

United States v.
Urias-Escobar, 281 F.3d 165 (5th Cir. Jan. 23, 2002), cert.
denied, 122 S.Ct. 2377 (2002) (Texas conviction for misdemeanor
assault with bodily injury, with one year suspended sentence
imposed, was an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) that warranted an enhanced sentence
under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 for illegal re-entry).

United States v. Insaulgarat,
378 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. July 19, 2004) (Florida conviction
of aggravated stalking (after being subject to a domestic
violence protective order, "knowingly, willfully, maliciously,
and repeatedly follows or harasses another person"),
in violation of Florida Statute § 784.048(4) (1993), did not
constitute a crime of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G.

Zaidi v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 357
(5th Cir. June 21, 2004) (Oklahoma conviction for sexual battery
("the intentional touching, mauling or feeling of the
body or private parts of any person sixteen (16) years of
age or older, in a lewd and lascivious manner and without
the consent of that other person . . . ."), in violation
of Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.

United States v. Sarmiento-Funes,
374 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. June 21, 2004) (Missouri conviction
of sexual assault, in violation of Mo. Ann. Stat. § 566.040(1)
committed if "he has sexual intercourse with another
person knowing that he does so without that persons consent,"
did not qualify as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2
cmt. n.1(B)(ii), for purposes of 16-level enhancement of sentence
for illegal re-entry).

Nguyen v. Ashcroft,
366 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. Apr. 26, 2004) (Oklahoma conviction
for facilitation of a drive-by shooting, under 21 Okl.St.Ann.
§ 652, subd. B., constituted a crime of violence aggravated
felony for deportation purposes).

United States v. Valdez-Maltos, __
F.3d __, 2006 WL 766601 (5th Cir. Mar. 27, 2006)
(Texas conviction of burglary of a habitation, is a crime
of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes).