United States v. Rodriquez-Rodriguez,
388 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. Oct. 15, 2004) (Texas conviction under
Penal Code § 30.02, burglary of a building, is not a crime
of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes since
the statute does not require the use of force as an element).

Bejarano-Urrutia v.
Gonzales, 413 F.3d 444 (4th Cir. July 5, 2005) (Virginia conviction
for simple involuntary manslaughter, in violation of Va. Code
Ann. § 18.2-36 (2004), which requires the killing of a person
as a proximate result of the defendants reckless disregard
for human life, did not constitute a crime of violence aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F),
18 U.S.C.

Wireko v. Reno, 211 F.3d 833
(4th Cir. May 4, 2000) (Virginia conviction of misdemeanor
sexual battery, in violation of Va.Code 1950, § 18.2-67.4,
was a crime of violence, and therefore an aggravated felony
under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for
immigration purposes precluding judicial review of a removal
order), distinguished by Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727
(7th Cir. Mar. 5, 2001).

United States v. Fierro-Reyna,
__ F.3d __ (5th Cir. Sept.

United States v. Velasco,
___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 2729670 (5th Cir. Sept. 27, 2006) (Illinois
conviction for aggravated battery, under 720 IL. COMP. STAT.

Larin-Ulloa v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __,
2006 WL 2441387 (5th Cir. Aug. 24, 2006) (Kansas conviction
of aggravated battery under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3414(a)(1)(C),
defined as intentional physical contact with a deadly weapon
in a rude, insulting or angry manner defines a crime which
is categorically a "crime of violence," under 18
U.S.C. § 16(b) and thus an aggravated felony for removal
purposes).

United States v. Mendoza-Sanchez, ___
F.3d ___, 2006 WL 1966655 (5th Cir. Jul. 14, 2006) (Arkansas
conviction of burglary, in violation of Ark.Code Ann.

United
States v. Fernandez-Cusco, __ F.3d __ (5th Cir.
Apr. 20, 2006) (Minnesota felony conviction for third degree
sexual conduct, under Minn. Stat. 8 § 609.344, is not necessarily
a "forcible sex offense," and therefore not categorically
a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes).

Popal v. Gonzalez, 416
F.3d 249 (3d Cir. July 29, 2005) (Pennsylvania conviction
of simple assault (reckless), in violation of Pennsylvania
Penal Code § 18 Pa.C.S.A. 2701, is not an aggravated felony
crime of violence for immigration purposes, since a mens rea
of recklessness is insufficient to qualify as a crime of violence
under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)).

Tran v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 464 (3d Cir.
July 12, 2005) (Pennsylvania conviction of "reckless
burning or exploding," in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
3301(d)(2), did not constitute a crime of violence under 18
U.S.C. § 16(b), and was therefore not an aggravated felony
crime of violence under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.