Szucz-Toldy v. Gonzalez, 400 F.3d
978 (7th Cir. Mar.

Santos v. Reno, 228 F.3d 591 (5th
Cir. Sept. 26, 2000) (Texas conviction of burglary of vehicle,
in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.04(c), with sentence
of five years deferred adjudication, constituted crime of
violence and was therefore an aggravated felony under INA
§ 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) for purposes of
deportation).

United States v.
Jackson, 220 F.3d 635 (5th Cir. July 26, 2000), cert. denied,
532 U.S. 988, 121 S.Ct. 1640 (2001) (Texas conviction of unauthorized
use of a vehicle, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 31.07,
was a "crime of violence" as that term is defined
in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, which is different from the language
of 18 U.S.C. § 16), overruled by United States v. Charles,
301 F.3d 309 (5th Cir.

Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d
788 (5th Cir. May 1, 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1069, 121
S.Ct. 757 (2001) (Texas conviction of burglary of vehicle
with intent to commit theft, in violation of Tex. Penal Code
§ 30.04(a) (West 1987), with suspended sentence of four years
imprisonment, was a "crime of violence," and therefore
an aggravated felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F)).

United States v.
DeSantiago-Gonzalez, 207 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 2000)
(New Mexico convictions of misdemeanor offenses of driving
while intoxicated, prior to deportation, qualified as "crimes
of violence," to justify four-level increase in offense
level under U.S.S.G.

Camacho-Marroquin
v. INS, 188 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. Sept. 29, 1999) (Texas conviction
of felony offense of driving while intoxicated was crime of
violence and aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) for immigration purposes), opinion
withdrawn, rehearing dismissed by Camacho-Marroquin v. INS,
222 F.3d 1040 (5th Cir. July 11, 2000).

United States v. Delgado-Enriquez,
188 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. Sept. 10, 1999) (Colorado conviction
of first-degree criminal trespass by one who "knowingly
and unlawfully enters or remains in a dwelling or if he enters
any motor vehicle with intent to steal anything of value"
in violation of Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 18-4-502, was crime
of violence under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)
and 18 U.S.C.

United States v. Gracia-Cantu,
302 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. Aug. 9, 2002) (Texas conviction of
injury to child, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 22.04(a),
was not "crime of violence," and so did not qualify
as an "aggravated felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) for illegal re-entry sentence enhancement
purposes).

United States v. Charles, 301 F.3d
309 (5th Cir. July 31, 2002) (en banc) (Texas conviction of
simple motor vehicle theft was not a crime of violence under
U.S.S.G.

United States v.
Cervantes-Nava, 281 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. Feb. 4, 2002), cert.
denied, 122 S.Ct. 2379 (2002) (Texas conviction of driving
while intoxicated was not a crime of violence aggravated felony,
under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), warranting
increase in base offense level for illegal re-entry offense).