United States v. Ramos-Garcia,
95 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. Sept. 5, 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1083 (1997) (Texas conviction for burglary of vehicle in violation
of Penal Code § 30.04 (1993) was an "aggravated felony
" under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)
within meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b) sentence enhancement
for illegal re-entry after deportation, despite change in
Texas law, Texas Penal Code Ann.

United States v. Rodriguez-Guzman,
56 F.3d 18 (5th Cir. June 6, 1995) (Texas conviction for burglary
of automobile, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.04 (1994),
was a crime of violence, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b),
constituting an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of sentencing enhancement
under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Rodriguez-Guzman,
56 F.3d 18 (5th Cir. June 6, 1995) (Texas conviction for burglary
of nonresidential building in violation of Texas Penal Code
§ 30.02 (1994), was a crime of violence, as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 16(b), constituting an aggravated felony under INA
§ 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of
sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Guadardo,
40 F.3d 102 (5th Cir. Dec. 2, 1994) (Texas conviction of burglary
of habitation in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.02 was
a crime of violence, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), constituting
an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of sentencing enhancement under
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2) for illegal re-entry after deportation).

Patel v. Ashcroft, 401
F.3d 400 (6th Cir. Mar. 8, 2005) (Illinois conviction of criminal
sexual abuse, in violation of 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/12-15,
constituted a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), and
was therefore an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C.

United States v. Arnold, 58 F.3d 1117, 1122 n. 4 (6th Cir.
July 13, 1995) (Tennessee conviction for assault with intent
to commit sexual battery is not categorically a "crime
of violence" for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon
with a firearm) because the minimum conduct of the offense
can be committed through force or coercion).

Quezada-Luna
v. Gonzalez, __ F.3d __, 2006 WL 508716 (7th Cir.
Mar.

United States v. Jaimes-Jaimes,
406 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. May 4, 2005) (Wisconsin conviction
for discharging a firearm into a vehicle or building, in violation
of W.S.A. § 941.20(2)(a), was not a conviction for a "crime
of violence" so as to warrant a 16-level increase in
the offense level under U.S.S.G.

Szucz-Toldy v. Gonzalez, 400 F.3d
978 (7th Cir. Mar.

Santos v. Reno, 228 F.3d 591 (5th
Cir. Sept. 26, 2000) (Texas conviction of burglary of vehicle,
in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.04(c), with sentence
of five years deferred adjudication, constituted crime of
violence and was therefore an aggravated felony under INA
§ 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) for purposes of
deportation).