United States v. Martinez-Carillo,
250 F.3d 1101 (7th Cir. May 17, 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct.

Xiong v. INS, 173 F.3d 601 (7th
Cir. Apr. 12, 1999) (Wisconsin conviction of "sexual
contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained
the age of 16 years," in violation of W.S.A. § 948.02(2),
was not a "crime of violence," and thus was not
an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

United States v.
Garcia-Juarez, 421 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. Aug. 29, 2005) (Iowa
conviction of lascivious acts with a child, in violation of
Iowa Code § 709.8, is an aggravated felony crime of violence
both for immigration and sentencing purposes).

United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,
335 F.3d 793 (8th Cir. July 14, 2003) (Utah conviction of
automobile homicide, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(1),
held to be a crime of violence for purposes of illegal re-entry
16-level sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Valladares, 304 F.3d
1300 (8th Cir. Sept. 26, 2002) (California conviction for
second-degree robbery under Penal Code § 211 constituted an
aggravated felony within meaning of version of Sentencing
Guidelines in effect at time of defendants current offense,
so that application of amended guideline, which provided for
the same increase, did not violate the Ex Post Facto clause).

United States v. Gomez-Hernandez,
300 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. Aug. 28, 2002) (Iowa conviction of
going armed with intent to use a weapon unlawfully, in violation
of Iowa Code § 708.8, is a crime of violence and therefore
an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(43)(F), and justifies illegal re-entry sentence enhancement
under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)).

United States v. Gomez-Hernandez,
300 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. Aug. 28, 2002) (California conviction
of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor, in violation
of California Penal Code § 261.5(d), is a crime of violence
and therefore an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), and justifies illegal re-entry
sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)).

Omar v. INS, 298 F.3d 710
(8th Cir. Aug. 5, 2002) (Minnesota conviction of criminal
vehicular homicide, in violation of M.S.A. § 609.21, subd.
1(4), was a crime of violence, and therefore was an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F),
for removal purposes).

United States v. Guzman-Landeros,
207 F.3d 1034, 1035 (8th Cir. Mar. 27, 2000) (Texas convictions
for burglary of vehicle constituted aggravated felonies as
crimes of violence under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F),
for purposes of sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) to sentence for illegal re-entry).

United States v. Alas-Castro,
184 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. June 26, 1999) (Nebraska conviction
for sexual assault of a child, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 28-320.01(1), was a crime of violence for which term of
imprisonment was at least one year, and thus constituted an
"aggravated felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8
U.S.C.