United
States v. Piccolo, 441 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. Apr. 3, 2006) (Escape
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 751(a), which includes failure
to return to a non-secured halfway house, is not necessarily
a crime of violence for federal armed career offender sentencing
purposes).
Valencia v. Gonzales,
439 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 2006) (California conviction
of engaging in unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who
is more than three years younger than the perpetrator under
Penal Code § 261.5(c) is not categorically a crime of violence
under 18 U.S.C. § 16 for deportation purposes, since it does
not have force as an element, under 18 U.S.C.
United States v.
Serna, 435 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. Jan. 23, 2006) (California
conviction for possession of assault weapon in violation of
California Penal Code § 12280(b) was not "crime of violence"
under the federal Sentencing Guidelines for purposes of illegal
re-entry sentence enhancement).
United States v. Guerrero-Velasquez,
434 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 2006) (Washington conviction
of second-degree burglary, under Wash. Rev.
United States v. Valladares, 304 F.3d
1300 (8th Cir. Sept. 26, 2002) (California conviction for
second-degree robbery under Penal Code § 211 constituted an
aggravated felony within meaning of version of Sentencing
Guidelines in effect at time of defendants current offense,
so that application of amended guideline, which provided for
the same increase, did not violate the Ex Post Facto clause).
United States v. Gomez-Hernandez,
300 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. Aug. 28, 2002) (Iowa conviction of
going armed with intent to use a weapon unlawfully, in violation
of Iowa Code § 708.8, is a crime of violence and therefore
an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(43)(F), and justifies illegal re-entry sentence enhancement
under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)).
United States v. Gomez-Hernandez,
300 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. Aug. 28, 2002) (California conviction
of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor, in violation
of California Penal Code § 261.5(d), is a crime of violence
and therefore an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), and justifies illegal re-entry
sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)).
Omar v. INS, 298 F.3d 710
(8th Cir. Aug. 5, 2002) (Minnesota conviction of criminal
vehicular homicide, in violation of M.S.A. § 609.21, subd.
1(4), was a crime of violence, and therefore was an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F),
for removal purposes).
United States v. Guzman-Landeros,
207 F.3d 1034, 1035 (8th Cir. Mar. 27, 2000) (Texas convictions
for burglary of vehicle constituted aggravated felonies as
crimes of violence under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F),
for purposes of sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) to sentence for illegal re-entry).
United States v. Alas-Castro,
184 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. June 26, 1999) (Nebraska conviction
for sexual assault of a child, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 28-320.01(1), was a crime of violence for which term of
imprisonment was at least one year, and thus constituted an
"aggravated felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8
U.S.C.