United States v. Sarmiento-Funes,
374 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. June 21, 2004) (Missouri conviction
of sexual assault, in violation of Mo. Ann. Stat. § 566.040(1)
committed if "he has sexual intercourse with another
person knowing that he does so without that persons consent,"
did not qualify as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2
cmt. n.1(B)(ii), for purposes of 16-level enhancement of sentence
for illegal re-entry).

Nguyen v. Ashcroft,
366 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. Apr. 26, 2004) (Oklahoma conviction
for facilitation of a drive-by shooting, under 21 Okl.St.Ann.
§ 652, subd. B., constituted a crime of violence aggravated
felony for deportation purposes).

United States v. Valdez-Maltos, __
F.3d __, 2006 WL 766601 (5th Cir. Mar. 27, 2006)
(Texas conviction of burglary of a habitation, is a crime
of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes).

United States v. Stapleton,
440 F.3d 700 (5th Cir. Feb. 16, 2006) (Louisiana conviction
for false imprisonment while armed with a dangerous weapon,
in violation of La. Rev. Stat. Ann § 14:46.1(A) is a violent
felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e), because it necessarily presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another).

United States v. Torres-Diaz,
438 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. Jan. 30, 2006) (Connecticut conviction
of second-degree assault under Conn. Gen.Stat.

United States v. Gonzalez-Chavez,
432 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. Nov. 30, 2005) (Florida conviction
of aggravated battery under § 784.045 of the Florida Statutes
is divisible, as the statute may be violated by any assault
on a pregnant woman, including spitting, which does not involve
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force, and therefore
may not be an aggravated felony crime of violence for sentencing
purposes).

Gonzalez-Garcia v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d
234 (5th Cir. Nov. 16, 2005) (Texas conviction of assault,
in violation of Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(3) ("intentionally
or knowingly causes physical contact with another when the
person knows or should reasonably believe that the other will
regard the contact as offensive or provocative"), did
not constitute a crime of violence aggravated felony under
INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

United States
v. Alfaro, 408 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. Apr. 28, 2005) (Virginia
conviction of shooting into an occupied dwelling, in violation
of Va.Code § 18.202-79 (1993), did not constitute a crime
of violence for purposes of enhancing sentence for illegal
re-entry by sixteen levels under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Martinez-Mata,
393 F.3d 625 (5th Cir. Dec. 10, 2004) (Texas conviction of
retaliation under Texas Penal Code § 36.06 is not a crime
of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes since
it does not have, as an element, the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force).

United States v. Rodriquez-Rodriguez,
388 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. Oct. 15, 2004) (Texas conviction under
Penal Code § 31.07(a), unauthorized use of a motor vehicle,
is not a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing
purposes since the statute does not require the use of force
as an element).