United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez,
374 F.3d 808 (9th Cir.

Brooks v. Ashcroft, 283 F.3d
1268, 1273 n.5 (11th Cir. Mar. 1, 2002) (Florida conviction
of false imprisonment under Fla. Stat. § 787.02 is a crime
of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16, and thus an aggravated felony
under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for
purposes of deportation).

Choeum v. INS, 129 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. Nov.
5, 1997) (New York conviction of kidnapping was crime of violence
under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), since it had force as an element,
and therefore constituted an "aggravated felony "
under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) for immigration
purposes).

Jobson v. Ashcroft,
326 F.3d 367 (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2003) (New York conviction
of manslaughter in the second degree, under N.Y.P.L. § 125.15(1),
is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and thus
is not an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

Greenidge v. INS, 204 F.Supp.2d 594 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 29, 2001) (Arizona manslaughter conviction, in violation
of A.R.S. § 151-54, is a crime of violence, and therefore
an aggravated felony pursuant to INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F)), for removal purposes).

Francis v. Reno, 269 F.3d 162
(3d Cir. Oct. 16, 2001) (Pennsylvania conviction of vehicular
homicide, in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732, did not constitute
an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

Bejarano-Urrutia v. Gonzales,
413 F.3d 444 (4th Cir. July 5, 2005) (Virginia conviction
for simple involuntary manslaughter, in violation of Va. Code
Ann. § 18.2-36 (2004), which requires the killing of a person
as a proximate result of the defendants reckless disregard
for human life, did not constitute a crime of violence aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F),
18 U.S.C.

United States v. Dominguez-Ochoa,
386 F.3d 639 (5th Cir. Sept. 22, 2004) (Texas conviction of
criminally negligent homicide, under Tex. Penal Code § 19.05,
did not constitute crime of violence aggravated felony under
U.S.S.G.

United States
v. Pimental-Flores, 339 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2003)
(Washington conviction of third degree assault in violation
of court order, under Rev. Code of Washington § 26.50.110(4),
may fail to trigger a 16-level illegal re-entry sentence enhancement,
as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 (2001), because
the statute proscribes merely negligent assault).

United States
v. Gonzalez-Tamariz, 310 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2002)
(Nevada conviction of battery causing substantial bodily harm,
in violation of Nev.Rev.St. § 200.481, constituted aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.