Matter of SS, 22 I. & N. Dec. 458
(BIA Jan. 21, 1999) (Washington conviction of first-degree
robbery of an occupied home while armed with a handgun, in
violation of Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.56.200(1), with a sentence
to 55 months imprisonment, is an aggravated felony under INA
§ 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

Matter of LSJ, 21 I. & N. Dec. 973
(BIA July 29, 1997) (Florida conviction of robbery using a
handgun with a sentence of two and a half years in prison
constitutes an aggravated felony, within the meaning of INA
§ 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), as a crime of
violence for which the sentence is at least one year).

United States v. Insaulgarat,
378 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. July 19, 2004) (Florida conviction
of aggravated stalking (after being subject to a domestic
violence protective order, "knowingly, willfully, maliciously,
and repeatedly follows or harasses another person"),
in violation of Florida Statute § 784.048(4) (1993), did not
constitute a crime of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G.

United States v. Jones, 231 F.3d 508,
519-520 (9th Cir. Sept.

Matter of Yeung, 21 I. &
N. Dec. 610 (BIA Nov. 27, 1996) (Florida conviction of attempted
manslaughter with a knife constituted aggravated felony as
crime of violence with sentence imposed of one year or more
under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)).

Matter of Alcantar, 20 I.
& N. Dec. 801 (BIA May 25, 1994) (Illinois conviction
for involuntary manslaughter under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38,
para. 9-3(a), with a sentence to 10 years in prison, constituted
a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), and
an "aggravated felony" as defined in INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), for immigration purposes).

United States v. Morgan, 380 F.3d 698 (2d
Cir. Aug. 19, 2004) (New York conviction for second-degree
attempted murder, with sentence to indeterminate term of two-and-a-half
to seven-and-a-half years imprisonment, properly treated
as an "aggravated felony" for illegal re-entry sentencing
purposes, even though it was not an aggravated felony under
the relevant immigration statute at the time of the conviction).

Ng v. Attorney General, 436 F.3d 392 (3d Cir.
Feb. 7, 2006) (federal conviction of use of interstate commerce
facilities in the commission of a murder-for-hire, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1958, constitutes a crime of violence aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

Castiglia v. INS, 108 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 1997) (second-degree
murder conviction constituted aggravated felony under INA
§ 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A)).

Lettman v. Reno, 207 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. Mar. 31, 2000) (Florida:
conviction of third-degree murder constitutes an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A),
for deportation purposes).