United States v. Stapleton,
440 F.3d 700 (5th Cir. Feb. 16, 2006) (Louisiana conviction
for false imprisonment while armed with a dangerous weapon,
in violation of La. Rev. Stat. Ann § 14:46.1(A) is a violent
felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e), because it necessarily presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another).

United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez,
431 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2005) (California conviction
of felony false imprisonment, in violation of Penal Code §
236, 237 constitutes a divisible statute, encompassing some
offenses that constitute crimes of violence within the meaning
of U.S.S.G.

United States
v. Pimental-Flores, 339 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2003)
(Washington conviction of third degree assault in violation
of court order, under Rev. Code of Washington § 26.50.110(4),
may fail to trigger a 16-level illegal re-entry sentence enhancement,
as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 (2001), because
the statute proscribes merely negligent assault).

United States
v. Gonzalez-Tamariz, 310 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2002)
(Nevada conviction of battery causing substantial bodily harm,
in violation of Nev.Rev.St. § 200.481, constituted aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

United States
v. Ceron-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. July 26, 2000) (Arizona
conviction for attempted aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon or deadly instrument, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat.
§ 13-1001 and 13-1204(A)(2) and (B), constitutes an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F),
for purposes of illegal re-entry sentence enhancement under
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)).

United States
v. Treto-Martinez, 421 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. Sept. 7, 2005)
(Kansas conviction of aggravated battery against a law enforcement
officer, in violation of K.S.A.

United States v. Perez-Vargas, 414 F.3d
1282 (10th Cir. July 15, 2005) (Colorado conviction for third-degree
assault, "knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury
to another person or with criminal negligence he causes bodily
injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon,"
in violation of C.R.S.

United States v. Holguin-Enriquez, 120
F.Supp.2d 969 (D.Kan. Oct. 12, 2000) (Washington conviction
for criminal assault, with one-year suspended sentence, constituted
an aggravated felony as crime of violence under INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) for purpose of imposing 16-level
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) to defendants
base offense level for illegal re-entry).

Matter of Martin, 23 I. & N. Dec.
491 (BIA Sept. 26, 2002) (Connecticut conviction of third-degree
assault, in violation of section 53a-61(a)(1) of the Connecticut
General Statutes, which involves the intentional infliction
of physical injury upon another, is a crime of violence under
18 U.S.C. § 16(a), for deportation purposes).

Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d
533, 540-541 (3d Cir. Jan. 3, 2006) (Pennsylvania misdemeanor
conviction of recklessly endangering another person, in violation
of 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 2705, with a sentence of one year
or more, did not constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 16(a), and was not a felony conviction, and therefore did
not constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.